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INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2002, Mohammed Jawad, an Afghan juvenile,1
allegedly threw a grenade at a passing U.S. Special Forces vehicle in Kabul,
Afghanistan.2 The grenade injured two U.S. soldiers and an Afghan
interpreter.3 Mohammed Jawad was arrested the same day by Afghan Forces.
While his accounts of what happened leading up to his arrest varied,
Mohammed Jawad asserted that while in the custody of local Afghan police,
he was tortured.4 He further claimed that Afghan officials coerced him,
through beatings and threats against his life, to apply his fingerprint to a
written confession declaring that he had thrown the explosive device at the
American military vehicle.5 Notably, Mohammed Jawad was illiterate at the

1. Mohammed Jawad does not know his birthday. He believes himself to have been sixteen
at the time of his arrest, although the U.S. military asserted that he was seventeen. See Releasing
Jawad: A Boy’s Life at Guantanamo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 11, 2010, 10:23 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/01/11/releasing-jawad-boys-life-guantanamo#
[hereinafter
Releasing Jawad]. Family members of Mohammed Jawad suggested he was between the ages of
twelve and seventeen when he was arrested. Mohammed Jawad, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 26, 2012,
4:27 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/26/mohammed-jawad.
2. Memorandum from Major Gen. Jay W. Hood to Commander, U.S. S. Command 3 (Sept.
30, 2005) [hereinafter Memo from Jay W. Hood].
3. Jamil Dakwar, Guantánamo’s Frequent Flyer Program, ACLU (June 20, 2008, 4:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/guantanamos-frequent-flyer-program.
4. Off. for the Admin. Review of the Det. of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base
Guantanamo Bay, Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings for ISN 900 21151
(2005),
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/77546-isn-900-mohamed-jawad-administrativereview/4a8d7364bad2d32e/full.pdf.
5. Id.; see also Darrel J. Vandeveld, I Was Slow to Recognize the Stain of Guantanamo, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
18,
2009),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/14/AR2009011402319.html.
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time.6 He was soon after delivered to U.S. custody and transferred to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on February 6, 2003.7
While in detention at Guantanamo Bay, Mohammed Jawad was
subjected to targeted sleep deprivation through a program referred to as the
Frequent Flyer Program.8 The euphemism denotes the practice of repeatedly
and systematically moving a detainee from cell to cell in order to disrupt the
detainee’s sleep.9 In Mohammed Jawad’s case, he was moved between cells
every three hours for fourteen consecutive days, totaling 112 moves.10 Each
transfer was made more time-consuming by his shackled hands and feet.11
Following his stint in the Frequent Flyer Program and efforts to isolate the
teen, Jawad’s already declining mental health took a turn for the worse. On
December 25, 2003, Jawad attempted suicide.12
The Frequent Flyer Program was one of several enhanced interrogation
techniques employed against foreign combatants in the wake of 9/11. The
interrogation methods ranged from slaps to forced standing positions to
waterboarding to various forms of sleep deprivation and sleep interruption.13
The sleep deprivation techniques varied in form, including keeping detainees
constantly awake for seven consecutive days or frequently interrupting a
detainee’s sleep for months on end.14 Methods of keeping detainees awake
included shackling them in stress positions, dousing them with cold water,
and exposing them to loud music or flashing lights.15 But despite careful
legal maneuvering and creative interpretations of both domestic and
international definitions of torture, the enhanced interrogation techniques
were ultimately widely condemned by both foreign and domestic players as
torture.16
6. David J.R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantanamo, 60
DUKE L.J. 1367, 1368 (2011); The Forgotten Kid of Guantánamo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 27,
2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/27/forgotten-kid-guantanamo.
7. Memo from Jay W. Hood, supra note 2, at 3.
8. David J.R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo: The Torture of Mohammed Jawad, 22
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter Frakt, Closing Argument]; see also Vandeveld, supra
note 5.
9. Dakwar, supra note 3.
10. Frakt, Closing Argument, supra note 8, at 5.
11. Id.; see also Vandeveld, supra note 5.
12. Releasing Jawad, supra note 1.
13. See generally Mark P. Denbeaux et al., How America Tortures (Dec. 2, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494533.
14. Id. at 25 (citing INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN
“HIGH-VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY 15 (2007)).
15. Id. at 25 (citing RANDALL MARK SCHMIDT & JOHN FURLOW, ACLU-RDI 4998,
INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
DETENTION FACILITY 10-1 (2005)).
16. See generally Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2004) https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/red-cross-finds-detainee-abuse-in-
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At the outset of the Obama Administration, the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques was banned and intelligence gathering from enemy
combatants was limited to those authorized in Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on
Human Intelligence Collector Operations.17 Yet, an artifact of the old
program remains: By its own language, the Army Field Manual allows for a
detainee to have as little as four hours of sleep a night for up to thirty days,
with the opportunity to extend the period of restricted sleep.18
A considerable amount of scholarship has analyzed the enhanced
interrogation techniques through the torture framework.19 This Article
applies the domestic torture analysis to the version of sleep deprivation
currently permitted by the Army Field Manual and demonstrates the ongoing
weaknesses of domestic law and guidance pertaining to foreign detainees and
torture. This Article does so by discussing the permissible use of sleep
deprivation presently available to U.S. interrogators of foreign enemy
combatants on foreign soil and analyzes it under the domestic federal antitorture framework.20 It argues that given medical research on the impacts of
sleep deprivation, this permissible version of sleep deprivation can
profoundly disrupt the personality of its subjects for prolonged periods, rising
guantanamo.html; Tom Miles, U.N. Expert Says Torture Persists at Guantanamo Bay; U.S. Denies,
REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2017, 8:44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guantanamo-tortureidUSKBN1E71QO; AMNESTY INT’L, Torture, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/torture/
(last visited Dec. 6, 2021); Douglas A. Johnson, Alberto Mora & Averell Schmidt, The Strategic
Costs of Torture: How “Enhanced Interrogation” Hurt America, FOREIGN AFFS., Sept./Oct. 2016,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/strategic-costs-torture;
Obama:
“We
Tortured Some Folks” After 9/11, CBS NEWS (Aug. 1, 2014, 4:15 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-we-tortured-some-folks-after-911/.
17. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009).
18. Army Field Manual 2-22.3 is vague with respect to the permissible number of nights of the
four hour a night sleep restriction. It is framed as a safeguard for the separation technique
(discussed infra notes 132–144 and accompanying text), which is restricted to thirty-day periods
with the option of renewal. For the purposes of the torture analysis, the author has elected to read
the manual in a light more favorable to the drafters and will assume an actus reus of four hours of
sleep each night for thirty nights. That being said, the vagueness of the language in the Army Field
Manual leaves detainees susceptible to even longer periods of chronic sleep deprivation and is
demonstrative of the ongoing weaknesses of U.S. safeguards intended to proscribe torturous
behavior. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
OPERATIONS A-30, M-10 (2006) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3].
19. See, e.g., Mary Hunter Morris McDonnell, Loran F. Nordgren & George Loewenstein,
Torture in the Eyes of the Beholder: The Psychological Difficulty of Defining Torture in Law and
Policy, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 87 (2011); Claire Finkelstein & Michael Lewis, Should Bush
Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted for Authorizing Torture?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
195 (2010); David Luban & Katherine S. Newell, Personality Disruption as Mental Torture: The
CIA, Interrogational Abuse, and the U.S. Torture Act, 108 GEO. L.J. 333 (2019); David Luban &
Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 823 (2012); Parisa
Zangeneh, ‘The Gloves Came Off’: Torture and the United States After September 11, 2001, 2 INT’L
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 82 (2013); Joseph L. Falvey, Jr. & Brian D. Eck, Holding the High Ground: The
Operational Calculus of Torture and Coercive Interrogation, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 561 (2010).
20. See infra Part IV.
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to the level of mental torture.21 And while unverified reports have emerged
suggesting that the United States continues to interrupt or deprive detainees
of sleep at Guantanamo Bay, what is certain is that Army Field Manual 222.3’s guidelines still allow for a form of sleep deprivation. This Article
argues that despite the lessons of enhanced interrogation, the language of the
Army Field Manual’s guidelines pertaining to detainee sleep allows for
conduct that rises to the level of torture under U.S. federal law. It is
imperative to identify and address the vulnerabilities in the domestic torture
framework because so long as threats to national security are ongoing, so too
is the risk that decision-makers will exploit these limitations and engage in
torture.
In exploring the United States’ use of targeted sleep deprivation as a
form of torture, this Article considers current guidelines and practices
through the lens of a domestic legal framework. This Article proceeds in five
parts. Part I of this Article explores definitions of torture and their
international origins. Further, it discusses the systems through which antitorture legislation is enforced. Part II discusses the post-9/11 evolution of
U.S. practices of interrupting and denying detainees opportunities to sleep as
interrogational or punitive methods. Part III discusses the clinical types of
sleep deprivation as well as their physiological and psychological impact.
Part IV analyzes whether the current permissible form of sleep deprivation
constitutes torture within the domestic legal framework. Finally, Part V
discusses recommendations for changes to both domestic law and the Army
Field Manual’s permitted practice of denying a detainee sleep.
I. DEFINING TORTURE
Historically, the stated policy of the United States has been that it does
not torture.22 Indeed, it was George Washington who famously wrote:
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Beyond U.S. assent to the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture,
multiple presidents have been outspoken on U.S. policies against torture. George Washington and
John Adams famously decried and prohibited the use of torture during the American Revolution.
See Robert F. Kennedy Jr., America’s Anti-Torture Tradition, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2005),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-dec-17-oe-kennedy17-story.html.
Abraham
Lincoln promulgated a code of war, stating, “military necessity does not admit of cruelty . . . nor of
torture.” Charles Fried & Gregory Fried, Torture Apologists Stain Triumph Over Bin Laden, WASH.
POST (May 5, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/torture-apologists-stain-triumphover-bin-laden/2011/05/05/AFl7881F_story.html. In 2007, President George W. Bush asserted that
“[t]his government does not torture people.” Bush Says U.S. ‘Does Not Torture People,’ NBC
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2007, 10:25 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21148801/ns/us_newssecurity/t/bush-says-us-does-not-torture-people/#.Xu5nyJNKjOQ. In 2009, President Barack
Obama asserted the same. Frances Kerry, “America Does Not Torture,” Obama Tells Congress,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2009, 9:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-torture-sb/americadoes-not-torture-obama-tells-congress-idUSTRE51O0RY20090225.
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Should any [American Soldier be so base] and infamous as [to
injure] any [prisoner] . . . I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring
him to such severe & exemplary Punishment as the Enormity of
the Crime may require. Should it extend to Death itself, it will not
be disproportionate to its Guilt at such a Time and in such a
Cause. . . . [For by such conduct they bring] [Shame & Disgrace]
and Ruin to themselves & Country . . . .23
Yet, the term “torture” was often left undefined. In modern American
history, the domestic definition of torture underwent a genesis from its
conceptualization in international treaties to its crystallization in federal law.
A. The Geneva Conventions
While the practice of torture is neither new in custom nor endemic to
one culture, modern definitions of torture grew from arduous international
deliberation, which first gained broader consensus with the Geneva
Conventions. The impetus for their creation came in 1859 when a
businessman from Geneva, Jean-Henri Dunant, traveled to Northern Italy for
a meeting with Emperor Napoleon III.24 On his journey, he bore witness to
the Battle of Solferino.25 Dunant, horrified by the brutality that he observed,
penned Un Souvenir de Solferino (A Memory of Solferino).26 The piece,
published in 1862, was an account of the mêlée he observed,27 along with
recommendations for the formation of international committees comprised of
volunteer medical professionals to tend to wounded warriors on the
battlefield and in hospitals.28
Among his more revolutionary
recommendations, Dunant argued for all European nations to organize these
23. Letter from George Washington to Colonel Benedict Arnold (Sept. 14, 1775),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-01-02-0355 (first, second, and fifth
alterations in original).
24. Geneva Convention, HISTORY (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/world-warii/geneva-convention;
Henri
Dunant,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henri-Dunant#info-article-history (last visited Feb. 9,
2022).
25. The Battle of Solferino was the final battle in the second War of Italian Independence. See
Battle of Solferino, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Solferino
(last visited Feb. 9, 2022). The engagement took place on June 24, 1859, in Lombardy, Italy, where
combat raged between the Austrian army and the Franco-Piedmontese army. Id. In total, 40,000
men lost their lives. Id.; see also Geneva Convention, HISTORY, supra note 24.
26. HENRY DUNANT, UN SOUVENIR DE SOLFERINO (David H. Wright trans., The John C.
Winston Company 1911).
27. Among many remarkable descriptions, Dunant noted:
Sometimes the fighting becomes more terrible on account of the arrival of rushing,
galloping cavalry. The horses, more compassionate than their riders, seek in vain to step
over the victims of this butchery, but their iron hoofs crush the dead and dying. With the
neighing of the horses are mingled blasphemies, cries of rage, shrieks of pain and despair.
Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 80.
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committees dedicated to treating the wounded and to provide relief without
distinction of the nationality of the wounded.29 A year later, in 1863,
delegates from sixteen countries and military medical personnel traveled to
Geneva to draw up terms of a wartime humanitarian agreement, later known
as the first Geneva Convention.30 The first Geneva Convention, which was
dedicated to providing wartime protections for the wounded and sick, was
updated multiple times subsequent to its inception, but laid the groundwork
for further advances in international humanitarian law.31
In the wake of World War II and the trials at Nuremburg, the Geneva
Convention was expanded to four conventions that enshrined, among other
protections, the prohibition of torture, the creation of rules for dealing with
prisoners of war, and the extension of safeguards to civilians in wartime.32
Specifically, in Geneva Convention III, the signatories agreed that with
respect to “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,” torture
shall remain prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever,”33 which
necessarily includes torturing for the purposes of interrogation.34
Remarkably, while the conventions proscribe torture, they do not explicitly
define the term.35 The United States signed the third Geneva Convention on
August 12, 1949, and ratified it on August 2, 1955.36
B. The Convention Against Torture
It has historically been the U.S. government’s stated policy not to
engage in torture, not only to uphold American exceptionalism and values of
liberty and justice, but also to ensure the safety of its citizenry and servicemen
and women abroad.37 Decades after signing the third Geneva Convention,
29. Id. at 79, 89–90. These committees would come to be known as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”). History of the ICRC, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/en/history (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
30. Geneva Convention, HISTORY, supra note 24.
31. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
32. Geneva Convention, HISTORY, supra note 24.
33. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
34. Id. art. 17.
35. See generally id.
36. Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries, Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners
of
War,
INT’L
COMM.
RED
CROSS,
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/NORM/D6B53F5B5D14F35AC1256402003F9920?OpenDocument
(last
visited June 20, 2020).
37. The Department of Defense’s Law of Wars begins with a foreword from DoD General
Counsel, Stephen Preston, stating:
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the United States committed to an internationally recognized definition of
torture, but did so with reservations. The United Nations Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”), a treaty ten years in the making,38 prohibited the practice of torture,
and more specifically defined the term.39 Under the CAT, torture is defined
as:
The law of war is a part of our military heritage, and obeying it is the right thing to do.
But we also know that the law of war poses no obstacle to fighting well and prevailing.
Nations have developed the law of war to be fundamentally consistent with the military
doctrines that are the basis for effective combat operations. . . . Similarly, the law of
war’s prohibitions on torture and unnecessary destruction are consistent with the practical
insight that such actions ultimately frustrate rather than accomplish the mission.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ii (2016). The same work’s section on “Reciprocity
and Law of War Rules” further describes the strategic decision not torture, stating:
Considerations of reciprocity – i.e., the degree of confidence as to whether an adversary
will, in fact, abide by a certain rule – may be a critical factor in the willingness of States
to enter into treaty obligations.
Similarly, various treaty provisions also reflect, to varying degrees, the principle that
whether a rule is legally binding on a party depends on whether its opponent has accepted
and applied that same rule. For example, some law of war treaties have a “general
participation clause” – i.e., a clause specifying that the treaty only applies to an armed
conflict if all the parties to the armed conflict are also Parties to the treaty.
Id. at 89; see also Memorandum from Sec’y of State Colin L. Powell to the Couns. to the President
& Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affs. (Jan. 26, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 122–25 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter
Memo from Colin Powell]; Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def. William H. Taft IV to Couns.
to the President (Feb. 2, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra, at
129–33; Julian Borger, U.S. Military in Torture Scandal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2004, 6:44 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/apr/30/television.internationalnews.
38. The United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was a precursor to the
Convention Against Torture. The Declaration defined torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act
he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or other persons.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners.
G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), art. 1 (Dec. 9, 1975). The Declaration was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on December 9, 1975; however, the instrument was not legally binding on the
parties. Id.
39. Hans Danelius, Introductory Note on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L.,
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2022); see also G.A. Res.
39/46, art. 1 ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. The Declaration on Human Rights also
proscribes torture (without definition) as does the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (providing in Article 7 that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,” with an accompanying non-derogation clause in Article 4).
The United States of America signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on
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[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.40
The CAT definition of torture can be broken into four elements: (1)
infliction of severe pain or suffering (physical or mental); (2) with intent; (3)
for the purpose of obtaining third person information, obtaining a confession,
punishment, intimidating or coercing a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination; (4) by a public official or with a public official’s
acquiescence.41 The definition, while more precise than the language
provided in previous treaties, allows for a wide breadth of interpretations.
Indeed, it fails to designate any particular acts—such as sleep deprivation—
as torture, and it lacks an explanation as to what severe pain or suffering
signifies in either the physical or mental spheres.
The United States became a signatory to the CAT on April 13, 1988, but
did not ratify the convention until October 21, 1994, and only did so with
several reservations and understandings.42 The lack of specificity in the CAT
torture definition allowed for the United States to produce a narrower reading
of mental pain or suffering. Specifically, one of the United States’ stated
understandings was that:
[I]n order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened
October 5, 1977, but did not ratify the treaty until June 8, 1992. International Covenant on Civil
and
Political
Rights,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&clang=_en.
40. CAT, supra note 39, art. 1, ¶ 1.
41. See Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Report on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39/Add.5 (Feb. 5, 2010); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Aileen Nowlan
& Julia Spiegel, Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture Under International and Domestic Law,
52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 799 (2012).
42. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-9.en.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2022).
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infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the
administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3)
the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person
will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality.43
The purported rationale for limiting the scope of the definition of mental
torture was because of the subjectivity of the term “mental pain and
suffering.” More specifically, when the Committee on Foreign Relations
held a public hearing on the CAT, they noted in their subsequent report to the
Senate that mental pain and suffering was more subjective than physical
suffering, and that in determining when the severity of mental pain and
suffering rises to the level of torture, one should look to objective criteria
such as the degree of cruelty or inhumanity of the conduct causing the pain
and suffering.44 Moreover, the Committee expressed that the divergence
from the CAT’s torture definition was “intended to guard against the
improper application of the Convention to legitimate U.S. law enforcement
actions and thereby would protect U.S. law enforcement interests.”45
The Committee did hear objections to the understandings and
reservations proposed by the George H.W. Bush Administration. Among
them, Amnesty International USA argued that the U.N. Committee Against
43. Id. (Declarations and Reservations of the United States of America).
44. S. REP. NO. 101-30, at 13 (1990).
45. Id. at 15. The Committee further sought to clarify their understanding of the specific intent
requirement for torture, highlighting that police brutality does not amount to torture and that the
term is reserved for “deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic
beating, application of electric currents to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in
positions that cause extreme pain.” Id. at 14. During the Committee’s public hearing, the concern
that ratifying the convention would negatively impact law enforcement in the United States was
highlighted by Mark Richard, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice. In his statement, he argued that the definition of torture lacked precision
with respect to mental anguish and that this could lead to “unwarranted litigation in numerous areas
of law enforcement.” Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong. 12–13 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.). He went on to explain:
[The] proposed understanding [relating to mental torture] encompasses conduct
calculated to generate severe and prolonged mental suffering of the type which can
properly be viewed as rising to the level of torture. As such, it properly condemns as
torture intentional acts such as those designed to damage and destroy the human
personality. In contrast, it does not encompass the normal legal compulsions which are
properly a part of the criminal justice system interrogation, incarceration, prosecution,
compelled testimony against a friend, etc.—notwithstanding the fact that they may have
the incidental effect of producing mental strain.
Id. at 17.
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Torture should arbitrate a uniform definition of the term “torture” in order to
hold every state party to the same standard.46 Human Rights Watch
expressed grave concerns regarding the understanding related to the
definition of torture. The organization argued that the Administration’s
definition of torture was too narrow. They noted that regardless of the form
torture takes, its purpose is to cause severe mental suffering. As if reading
the tea leaves, Human Rights Watch argued:
In addition to failing to recognize the serious psychological impact
of torture, the administration’s mental suffering reservation is
short-sighted. The range of acts that constitute torture is limited
only by the imaginations of those who seek to perpetrate them. In
recent years governments that practice torture increasingly have
sought to devise methods that cause intense pain but leave no
marks. The era of psychological torture appears to be ahead of us.
It would be a mistake for the U.S. to interfere with the Committee
Against Torture’s ability to respond effectively to these new and
ever more cruel torture techniques.47
The subject of sleep deprivation as an interrogation tactic was
tangentially raised at the Committee’s hearing on the CAT.48 In the hearing,
sleep deprivation was discussed as an act that was considered to fall short of
torture.49 More specifically, the practice was framed as a form of “inhuman
or degrading treatment.”50

46. Hearing, supra note 45, at 57 (letter from Amnesty Int’l USA).
47. Id. at 94 (statement of Hum. Rts. Watch).
48. Sleep deprivation was raised as an example of inhuman or degrading treatment, not torture,
when discussing the United States’ reservation with regard to Article 16 of the CAT. The United
States’ reservation with respect to Article 16 was that:
[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation under article 16 to prevent
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, only insofar as the term ‘cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
supra note 42.
49. Hearing, supra note 45, at 80 (statement of David Weissbrodt on behalf of the Center for
Victims of Torture, the Minnesota Law International Human Rights Commission). The
Commission further considered but dismissed evidence that sleep deprivation constituted torture,
referring to it as “relatively mild coercion.” Id. at 166.
50. Id. at 80. The Committee reviewed evidence discussing a 1978 case from the European
Court of Human Rights, Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978), which
applied articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (which proscribes torture yet fails to
define the term) to the question of whether hooding, wall standing, subjection to continuous loud
noise, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink rose to the level of torture. Case of
Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R 25. Notably, the case did not apply the CAT definition of torture. Hearing,
supra note 45; see also Case of Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.
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C. Incorporating the CAT Definition into U.S. Law: 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340–2340A
The United States incorporated the language from the CAT definition
and its own reservations to that definition in federal anti-torture legislation,
which came into effect on November 20, 1994.51 The statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2340A, criminalizes torture occurring outside the United States at the hands
of U.S. nationals or by an offender who enters the United States.52 The statute
defines torture as: “an act committed by a person acting under the color of
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control.”53 The statute further defined
“severe mental pain or suffering” as:
[T]he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from—(A) the
intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of mind-altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or the personality; (C) the threat of imminent death; or (D)
the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.54
The differences between the CAT definition of torture and the definition
under the criminal anti-torture law in the U.S. federal code may appear minor
at first blush, but they are not without consequence. The U.S. Code removes
the CAT language regarding the purpose of the harm inflicted (i.e., the act
no longer has to be an act seeking punishment or information collection) and
ultimately rearranges the language of intent. While the CAT definition of
torture (and negotiating history of the Convention) suggest that the intent
requirement for torture is that the act be inflicted for a prohibited purpose,55
the language in 18 U.S.C. § 2340 left the specifics of intent more ambiguous
when it removed the language of purpose.56 And though the Senate
Executive Report that accompanied the federal anti-torture statute
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A.
52. The federal criminal torture statute punishes acts of torture with up to twenty years in prison
and/or fines. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. If the torture results in death, the offender will be punished by
death or up to life in prison. Id. Similarly, there are civil penalties for acts of torture under the
Torture Victims Protection Act which bears a nearly identical definition of torture as the federal
criminal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
54. Id.
55. Hathaway et al., supra note 41, at 803–05.
56. Id. at 809.
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specifically noted that the “requirement of intent is emphasized in Article 1
[of the Convention] by reference to illustrative motives for torture,” the lack
of clarity in the written federal statute allowed for the more dubious
interpretations of intent adopted in the early days of the War on Terror.57
While the element of intent was made more ambiguous by the domestic
anti-torture statute, the element of “severe mental pain and suffering” became
exceedingly narrow.58 Where the Convention failed to define severe mental
pain or suffering, the United States’ reservations to the treaty narrowed the
scope of severe mental pain or suffering to four limited scenarios: (1) mental
pain associated with severe physical pain or suffering or threatened infliction
of severe pain or suffering; (2) threatening to or applying mind-altering drugs
or procedures to profoundly disrupt one’s senses or personality; (3) the threat
of imminent death; or (4) threatening to subject a third person to any of the
above.59 Moreover, the United States interprets mental pain and suffering to
require “prolonged mental harm.”60 Therefore, while CAT forbids inflicting
all acts of mental torture, the United States punishes a narrower scope of
actions so long as the results are a prolonged effect on the victim.61 In fact,
the United Nations’ Committee Against Torture has objected to the U.S.
definition of mental torture, noting that acts of psychological torture are not
limited to those yielding prolonged mental harm.62
D. The Torture Memos and the Rise of Enhanced Interrogation Tactics
Perhaps the most notorious interpretations of the modern U.S. definition
of torture arose in 2002, in the shadows of the September 11th attacks and
the War on Terror. The “Torture Memos,” as they would come to be known,
were a series of memoranda issued by John Yoo and Jay Bybee, then
attorneys for the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.63 The
57. Id. at 808 (quoting S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 14 (1990)).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(A)–(D).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Luban & Shue, supra note 19, at 846.
62. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
Against Torture, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); see also U.N. Committee
Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of United States
of America, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Concluding
Observations].
63. W. Bradley Wendel, The Torture Memos and the Demands of Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS
107, 109 (2009) (reviewing HAROLD H. BUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON
TERROR (2009); JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, THE
TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008); JOHN
YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006)).
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Memoranda devised legal arguments to frustrate protections against torture
for foreign fighters from al Qaeda and the Taliban and ultimately paved the
way for the enhanced interrogation techniques.
Some of the torture memos attempted to excuse the Bush
Administration from its duties with respect to detainees from the War on
Terror under the Geneva Conventions.64 On January 25, 2002, Alberto R.
Gonzales, the White House Counsel who would later be named the U.S.
Attorney General, submitted a memorandum to the President supporting
Yoo’s memo, which argued that the Geneva Convention III’s Prisoner of War
protections would not apply to al Qaeda and the Taliban.65 He argued that
the War on Terror was a new type of war requiring swift intelligence
collection and the ability to try suspected terrorists.66 Consequentially, he
argued “this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions
requiring that captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary
privileges, scrip (i.e., advances of monthly pay), athletic uniforms, and
scientific instruments.”67 President Bush ultimately agreed.68
On August 1, 2002, Assistant Attorney General, Jay S. Bybee, submitted
to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales a memorandum advising on the
standards of conduct for interrogation under the federal anti-torture statute.69
The conclusions effectively reinterpreted the definition of torture to a far
64. Specifically, a January 9, 2002, Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert Delahunty to General Counsel for the Department of Defense
William J. Haynes II argued that because Al Qaeda and the Taliban were not nation states, they
were not signatories to the Geneva Conventions, and, moreover, they were not included in noninternational forms of armed conflict to which some provisions of the Geneva Conventions might
apply. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. John Yoo & Special Couns. Robert J.
Delahunty to Dep’t of Def. Gen. Couns. William J. Haynes II (Jan. 9, 2002) (on file with Dep’t of
Just.). Additionally, the memo argued that even if the Taliban were an arm of the government of
Afghanistan, the nation’s status as a failed state rendered its military ineligible for Geneva
Convention protections. Id.
65. Memorandum from Couns. to the President Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W.
Bush (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with NSA) [hereinafter Memo from Gonzales to Bush].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. On February 7, 2002, President George W. Bush submitted a Memorandum to the Vice
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA and other members of the
executive branch agreeing that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were not entitled to protections under the
Geneva Conventions. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, the
Sec’y of State, the Sec’y of Def., the Att’y Gen., Chief of Staff to the President, Dir. of Cent. Intel.,
Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affs., & Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002)
(on file with the White House). Further, President Bush wrote that “[a]s a matter of policy, the
United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate
and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.” Id.
69. Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee to Couns. to the President Alberto
R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter Standards of Conduct
Memo].
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more limited and extreme version of the federal anti-torture statute. The
memo concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 2340 required that those acts “be of an
extreme nature” in order to amount to torture as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2340
and the Convention on Torture.70 It acknowledged that “certain acts may be
cruel, inhuman, or degrading,” but still not cause the level of intense pain and
suffering required for inclusion in the “proscription against torture.”71
The memo focused its limited vision of the definition of torture on the
severity of the pain for physical torture and the severity and duration of the
effects for mental torture. Bybee argued that physical pain that reaches the
level of torture “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function,
or even death.”72 Whereas, in Bybee’s vision, mental pain or suffering rises
to the level of torture when it results in “significant psychological harm of
significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”73
The Torture Memos reshaped the definition of torture and blazed the
path for the enhanced interrogation techniques.74
With the Bush Administration’s blessing, the enhanced interrogation
techniques made their way into CIA Black Sites (secret prisons on foreign

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. This interpretation of the word “severe” was derived from a health benefits statute. Id.;
see also Dahlia Lithwick, Opinion, The Worst Ideas of the Decade: The Torture Memos, WASH.
POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/worst-ideas/torturememos.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
73. Standards of Conduct Memo, supra note 69.
74. The Enhanced Interrogation Program was crafted by psychologists Bruce Jessen and James
Mitchell. Bill Chappell, Psychologists Behind CIA ‘Enhanced Interrogation’ Program Settle
Detainees’ Lawsuit, NPR (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/08/17/544183178/psychologists-behind-cia-enhanced-interrogation-program-settledetainees-lawsuit. The tactics, meant to “condition detainees into a state of helplessness,” were
inspired by the training program Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (“SERE”). Id.; see also
Memorandum from Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Steven G. Bradbury to Senior Deputy
Gen. Couns. John A. Rizzo 3 (May 30, 2005) (filed with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter Article 16
CAT Memo]. SERE training was a simulation program that prepared U.S. military personnel for
potential capture. Chappell, supra. The enhanced interrogation techniques included the following
methods: abdominal slap; attention grasp (an interrogator grabs the detainee by the collar with two
hands and pulls him close); cramped confinement (often in a box, sometimes large enough to stand,
for up to eighteen hours or a smaller box for up to two hours); dietary manipulation (switching from
solid foods to liquid); the facial hold (an interrogator holds a detainee’s head so they cannot move
and puts one hand on each side of the detainee’s face); the facial slap/insult slap; nudity; stress
positions; sleep deprivation; wall standing (a detainee faces a wall, standing around four feet away,
and is forced to touch the wall with his fingers); walling (slamming a detainee against a wall);
waterboarding; and water dousing (naked detainees were held down on a tarp on the floor, the tarp
would be lifted, and cold water would be poured on the detainee). Associated Press, These Are the
13 ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ the CIA Used on Detainees, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 10, 2014,
5:15 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-13-enhanced-interrogation-techniques-the-ciaused-on-detainees-2014-12.
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soil) and later to Guantanamo Bay. On October 2, 2002, a team of
psychologists and lawyers from multiple U.S. agencies met to devise a
framework of “‘psychological stressors’ and environmental manipulation to
‘foster dependence and compliance’” in the detainees in Guantanamo Bay.75
According to minutes from the October 2nd meeting, Jonathan Fredman, a
senior CIA lawyer, reportedly remarked, “[t]orture has been prohibited by
international law, but the language of the statutes is written vaguely . . . . It
is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies, you’re doing it
wrong.”76
That same month, military attorney Diane Beaver wrote legal
justifications for various interrogation methods and “‘the use of scenarios
designed to convince the detainee that death’ was ‘imminent.’”77 The
memorandum dictated that the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay were not
protected by the Geneva Conventions because they were not considered
“Enemy Prisoners of War,” and that Department of Defense interrogators,
who had been trained to apply Geneva Convention standards, had been using
commonly approved methods of interrogation including rapport building
through direct approach, rewards, and the use of deception.78 Beaver argued,
however, that the detainees at Guantanamo had cultivated “sophisticated”
interrogation resistance strategies because of their ability to communicate
amongst themselves.79 The memorandum recommended a series of “more
aggressive interrogation techniques.”80 With regard to sleep deprivation,
Beaver wrote:
There is no legal requirement that detainees must receive four
hours of sleep per night, but if a U.S. Court ever had to rule on this
procedure, in order to pass Eighth Amendment scrutiny, and as a
cautionary measure, they should receive some amount of sleep so
that no severe physical or mental harm will result.81
On December 2, 2002, the proposed enhanced interrogation techniques,
which included forced nudity, manipulation of diet, daily twenty-four hour
interrogations, waterboarding, freezing temperature exposure, withholding of
medical care, and sleep deprivation were submitted for Secretary of Defense

75. Ben Taub, Guantánamo’s Darkest Secret, NEW YORKER (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/22/guantanamos-darkest-secret.
76. Id. Jonathan Fredman has disputed the accuracy of the meeting minutes. See id.
77. Id.
78. Memorandum from Staff Judge Advoc. Diane E. Beaver to Commander, Joint Task Force
170 (Oct. 11, 2002) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Def.) [hereinafter Proposed Strategies Memo].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Donald Rumsfeld’s approval.82 He authorized the request, jotting a note in
the margin in reference to a proposed stress position: “I stand for 8–10 hours
a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”83
II. U.S. EMPLOYMENT OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION AS A TOOL OF
INTERROGATION AND PUNISHMENT
A. Sleep Deprivation in the Wake of 9/11
Sleep deprivation as an interrogative and punitive technique took on a
particularly grizzly form in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. A May 30, 2005
memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) to John Rizzo, then
Senior Deputy General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency,
described sleep deprivation as subjecting a detainee to an extended period of
sleeplessness in order to weaken the detainee’s resistance.84
The
memorandum stated that up to 180 hours (or 7.5 days) of continuous sleep
deprivation was permitted with authorization.85 It further described a
technique that deprived a detainee of sleep for more than ninety-six hours:
[A] detainee undergoing this technique is shackled in a standing
position with his hands in front of his body, which prevents him
from falling asleep but also allows him to move around within a
two- to three-foot diameter. The detainee’s hands are generally
positioned below his chin, although they may be raised above the
head for a period not to exceed two hours.86
The memorandum noted that some detainees may experience
physiological reactions as a result of such sleep deprivation, but dismissed
those concerns because subjects would “generally return to normal
neurological functioning with as little as one night of normal sleep.”87 The
only sources cited by the OLC for this conclusion were its own “review of
the literature on the physiology of sleep” and statements made by the CIA’s
own Office of Medical Services.88 Additionally, the only specific source
cited from the OLC’s “review of the relevant medical literature” is sleep

82. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Def. Gen. Couns. William J. Haynes II to Sec’y of Def.
Donald Rumsfeld (Dec. 2, 2002) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Def.) [hereinafter Proposed Techniques
Memo]; Taub, supra note 75; Proposed Strategies Memo, supra note 78.
83. Proposed Techniques Memo, supra note 82; Taub, supra note 75.
84. Article 16 CAT Memo, supra note 74.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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neuroscientist James Horne’s 1988 book, Why We Sleep: The Functions of
Sleep in Humans and Other Mammals.89
Another memorandum discussing sleep deprivation pertained to the
interrogation of Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn (also known as: Abu
Zubaydah), a high-level detainee who was previously held in a CIA black
site in Afghanistan and later transferred to Guantanamo Bay.90 In the leaked
2002 memorandum from the OLC to the Acting General Counsel of the CIA,
ten enhanced interrogation techniques were approved for use on Abu
Zubaydah.91 One of the methods submitted for consideration was sleep
deprivation.92 In its approval, the memorandum preemptively hedged against
criticisms regarding the potential effects of sleep deprivation, stating:
Sleep deprivation may be used. You have indicated that your
purpose in using this technique is to reduce the individual’s ability
to think on his feet and, through the discomfort associated with lack
of sleep, to motivate him to cooperate. The effect of such sleep
deprivation will generally remit after one or two nights of
uninterrupted sleep. You have informed us that your research has
revealed that, in rare instances, some individuals who are already
predisposed to psychological problems may experience abnormal
reactions to sleep deprivation. Even in those cases, however,
reactions abate after the individual is permitted to sleep. Moreover,
personnel with medical training are available to and will intervene
in the unlikely event of an abnormal reaction. You have orally
informed us that you would not deprive Zubaydah of sleep for
more than eleven days at a time and that you have previously kept
him awake for 72 hours, from which no mental or physical harm
resulted.93
Abu Zubaydah memorialized his experiences at Guantanamo in notes
and writings for himself and his lawyers.94 He described his sleep
deprivation:
I was deprived from sleep for a long period of time; I don’t even
know for how long: maybe two or three weeks or even more and it
felt like an eternity to the point that I found myself falling asleep
despite the water being thrown at me by the guard who found
89. Id. (citing JAMES HORNE, WHY WE SLEEP: THE FUNCTIONS OF SLEEP IN HUMANS AND
OTHER MAMMALS 23–24 (1988)); see also PROFESSOR JIM HORNE, http://jimhorne.co.uk/ (last
visited July 31, 2020).
90. Denbeaux et al., supra note 13, at 14.
91. Memorandum from Off. Of Legal Couns. Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee to Acting Gen.
Couns. of the CIA John Rizzo 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter
Memo from Bybee to Rizzo].
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Denbeaux et al., supra note 13, at 25–26.
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himself with no choice but to strongly and constantly shake me in
order to keep me awake. So I couldn’t even sleep for a short
second. Then I got used to the shaking just as I got used to the
water being thrown at me, so I was able to sleep for a second.95
Forced sleep deprivation was pervasive at Guantanamo Bay as well as
at CIA black sites. In fact, in a Department of Justice review of the FBI’s
involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in Guantanamo
Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the Department of Justice found that FBI agents
most frequently reported witnessing sleep deprivation and sleep disruption as
the techniques employed by military interrogators in black sites in
Afghanistan and Iraq.96 Many agents described the use of loud music or
flashing lights as the mode for interfering with a detainees’ sleep.97
The International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) was granted
limited access to Guantanamo Bay by the U.S. government in order to
confidentially report its findings regarding detainees.98 Despite the U.S.
government’s desire to keep any reporting confidential, a 2007 ICRC report
detailing the treatment of fourteen “High Value Detainees” at Guantanamo
Bay during their time in CIA custody was leaked. The report detailed the
ICRC’s grave concerns about violations of international law and revealed that
the CIA employed sleep deprivation techniques.99 The report specifically
covered the detainees’ time in CIA black sites.100 Eleven of the fourteen
detainees alleged that they had been deprived of sleep through days of
constant interrogation, forced stress positions, dousing in cold water, or by
exposure to loud noises or music.101 The duration and nature of the sleep
deprivation varied; some detainees alleged seven continuous days while
others alleged intermittent sleep deprivation that continued up to two or three
months.102 One detainee described being exposed to loud music for twentyfour hours a day, every day, for one year.103
Meanwhile, it was also reported that at the Guantanamo Bay detention
camp, detainees experienced various enhanced interrogation techniques,
95. Id.
96. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN AND
OBSERVATIONS OF DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN GUANTANAMO BAY, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ
(2009) [hereinafter FBI INVOLVEMENT REVIEW].
97. Id. at 61–62.
98. Guantanamo Bay: Overview of the IRC’s Work for Internees, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS (Mar. 1, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/update/5qrc5v.htm; see
also Lewis, supra note 16.
99. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN
“HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY (2007).
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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including protracted periods of sleep deprivation.104 Between 2002 and 2004,
more than 200 FBI agents who served at Guantanamo Bay reported to the
Department of Justice that they had “observed or heard about various rough
or aggressive treatment of detainees, primarily by military interrogators. The
most frequently reported techniques included sleep deprivation or sleep
disruption . . . .”105 In a confidential 2004 ICRC report to the United States
(that was subsequently leaked to The New York Times), the humanitarian
organization accused the United States of applying psychological and
physical coercion “tantamount to torture” to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.106
The report further alleged that doctors and medical workers at Guantanamo
participated in the planning of interrogations.107 The report highlighted,
among other tactics, detainee exposure to persistent loud noise and music,
cold temperatures, and beatings.108 The U.S. government adamantly rejected
the accusations.109 In response to the allegations, a Pentagon spokesman
commented, “[t]he United States operates a safe, humane and professional
detention operation at Guantánamo that is providing valuable information in
the war on terrorism.”110
Sleep deprivation was not improvised at Guantanamo Bay. It was
systematically planned and executed in various forms, including through the
Frequent Flyer Program, which was the punitive or interrogative tactic by
which detainees were constantly and methodically moved between cells in
order to disrupt their sleep.111 The Frequent Flyer Program existed in two
forms: an official version and an unofficial version.112 The official program
was explicitly approved for the use by the military at Guantanamo to “disrupt
detainees’ sleep in an effort to lessen their resistance to questioning and to
undermine cell block relationships among detainees.”113 Unofficially, the
Frequent Flyer Program was used as a disciplinary tactic at Guantanamo,
which was the case for Mohammed Jawad.114
One did not have to be “enrolled” in the Frequent Flyer Program to be
subjected to sleep deprivation at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. FBI
agents described a variety of tactics employed by military interrogators in

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

AMNESTY INT’L, GUANTÁNAMO: A DECADE OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS (2011).
Id. at 24 (citing FBI INVOLVEMENT REVIEW, supra note 96).
Lewis, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dakwar, supra note 3.
Id.
FBI INVOLVEMENT REVIEW, supra note 96, at xxi.
Dakwar, supra note 3.
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order to keep detainees awake.115 These methods included the use of bright
flashing strobe lights, extreme temperatures, and loud rock music.116
Mohamedou Salahi, a Mauritanian detained for his alleged ties to Al Qaeda,
experienced enhanced interrogation, and, more specifically, sleep
deprivation at Guantanamo.117 He described his experience:
The cell—better, the box—was cooled down to the point that I was
shaking most of the time. I was forbidden from seeing the light of
the day; every once in a while they gave me a rec-time at night to
keep me from seeing or interacting with any detainees. I was living
literally in terror. For the next seventy days I wouldn’t know the
sweetness of sleeping.118
B. Interrogation From 2009–Present
Soon after his inauguration, President Barack Obama, through executive
order, limited the use of interrogation techniques employed against foreign
combatants to those expressly permitted in the Army Field Manual on
collecting Human Intelligence.119 In Executive Order 13,491, “Ensuring
Lawful Interrogations,” the President did away with the enhanced
interrogation techniques, ordering that:
Effective immediately, an individual in the custody or under the
effective control of an . . . agent of the United States Government,
or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a
department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict,
shall not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach,
or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by
and listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (Manual).120
The language of the Executive Order identified its purpose:
[It attempted] to improve the effectiveness of human intelligencegathering, to promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of
individuals in United States custody and of United States personnel
115. FBI INVOLVEMENT REVIEW, supra note 96, at xxi.
116. Id.
117. Taub, supra note 75.
118. Id. In addition to sleep deprivation, Salahi was subjected to beatings, sensory deprivation,
sexual assault, and being made to believe his mother was going to be transferred to Guantanamo
and raped. Id. His physical and emotional vulnerabilities were exploited, his sciatica a guide for
selecting forced stress positions. Id. Interrogators decorated the walls with photos of genitalia and
Salahi’s insecurity regarding his childlessness inspired guards to erect a crib in a room where he
was held. Id. Salahi began hearing voices. Id. He wrote in his diary, “[t]o be honest I can report
very little about the next couple of weeks . . . because I was not in the right state of mind.” Id.
119. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009).
120. Id. Army Field Manual 2-22.3 and Executive Order 13,491 remain current and have, to
date, not been superseded. See Executive Orders, Federal Register, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders (last visited July 30,
2021); FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18.
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who are detained in armed conflicts, to ensure compliance with the
treaty obligations of the United States, including the Geneva
Conventions, and to take care that the laws of the United States are
faithfully executed . . . .121
This language of intent intimated that the previous framework, which
included the enhanced interrogation techniques, was in violation of the
Geneva Conventions, and perhaps the laws of the United States. But one
need not read between the lines of the executive order to understand the
impetus for its creation. In an August 1, 2014 press conference discussing
the release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s study of the
CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, President Obama stated:
[I]n the immediate aftermath of 9/11, we did some things that were
wrong. . . . [T]he character of our country has to be measured in
part not by what we do when things are easy, but what we do when
things are hard. And when we engaged in some of these enhanced
interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe and I think any
fair-minded person would believe were torture, we crossed a
line.122
Army Field Manual 2-22.3, last issued in 2006, describes Human
Intelligence (“HUMINT”) Collector Operations, including eighteen
approved interrogation approaches.123 The manual provides relevant
information on treating prisoners of war humanely including discussion of
the Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions.124 The manual
explicitly proscribes certain interrogation methods, including forced nudity,
forcing sexual acts or poses, hooding, using duct tape over the eyes, beatings,
burns, electric shocks, waterboarding, using military working dogs, inducing
hypothermia or heat injury, mock executions, and deprivation of necessary
food, water, or medical care.125
The vast majority of the approaches used for interrogation in the Army
Field Manual involve incentives, emotions, and silence to encourage
cooperation.126 For example, the “emotional love approach” is a tactic in
which the subject is made to believe that something he loves will be made

121. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
122. The President’s News Conference, 2014 PUB. PAPERS 1050, 1058 (2014).
123. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at 8-6–8-19; see also THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT
ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY
FORCE
AND
RELATED
NATIONAL
SECURITY
OPERATIONS
34
(2016),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5847db914.html [hereinafter THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT].
124. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at 5-18–5-21, A-1.
125. Id. at 5-21.
126. Id. at 8-6–8-19; see also THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 123.
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accessible to him if he is to provide the HUMINT collector with adequate
information.127
The 2006 Army Field Manual on HUMINT Collector Operations does
not explicitly discuss sleep deprivation as part of intelligence gathering
methodology. This is a departure from the manual’s immediate predecessor,
Army Field Manual 34-52 on Intelligence Interrogation, issued in September
of 1992.128 Remarkably, Army Field Manual 34-52 defined torture and went
so far as to give examples of what would constitute mental torture, including
“abnormal sleep deprivation,” although it never defined the term.129
It has been reported that the 2006 Army Field Manual was accompanied
by a separate training document that provided interrogation scenarios and
went into detail on what procedures could or could not be used in certain
circumstances.130 This document is said to be classified.131 The Manual does,
however, describe one restricted interrogation technique termed “separation”
that includes one cryptic reference to sleep requisites for detainees.132 The
stated purpose of the separation technique is to prevent the detainee from
communicating “with other detainees in order to keep [the subject] from
learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to
support a cover story, decreasing the detainee’s resistance to
interrogation.”133 There are two types of separation. Physical separation, the
preferred method of separation, involves physically isolating the detainee
away from others. However, where not feasible, one may use “field
expedient separation,” employing the use of goggles, blindfolds, and/or
earmuffs in order to “generate a perception of separation . . . and foster a
feeling of futility.”134

127. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at 8-9.
128. Id. at 5-20, 5-21, 5-26; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATION 1–8 (2006) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 34-52].
129. FIELD MANUAL 34-52, supra note 128, at 1-8.
130. Eric Schmitt, In New Manual, Army Limits Tactics in Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/28/politics/in-new-manual-army-limits-tactics-ininterrogation.html. Prior to the release of 2006 Army Field Manual 2-22.3, The New York Times
reported that officials said that the new manual will specifically prohibit “sleep deprivation as a tool
to get [detainees] to talk.” Id. That language does not exist in the field manual. FIELD MANUAL 222.3, supra note 18, at M-1–M-10.
131. Schmitt, supra note 130.
132. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at M-1–M-10.
133. Id. at M-8. The manual also makes clear that separation is not to include sensory
deprivation, “defined as an arranged situation causing significant psychological distress due to a
prolonged absence, or significant reduction, of the usual external stimuli and perceptual
opportunities.” Id. Further, it explains that “[s]ensory deprivation may result in extreme anxiety,
hallucinations, bizarre thoughts, depression, and anti-social behavior.” Id.
134. Id.
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Because the two separation methods are restricted, there are
authorization and oversight measures built in place to regulate their usage.135
The approval process for applying the separation tactic requires an
interrogator to develop an interrogation plan and submit it to an interrogation
supervisor.136
The supervisor ensures safeguards and reviews the
interrogation plans for necessity and appropriateness.137 Either a general
officer or flag officer approves any plans, extensions, or additional rounds of
separation use.138 The combatant commander approves overall use of
interrogation approach techniques.139 All levels of command in the chain
have access to staff judge advocates, behavioral science consultants, and
analysts for guidance.140 To extend the approved usage of the separation
techniques past thirty days, a staff judge advocate must review the request
for the extension and the same general officer or flag officer must give his or
her approval.141
In the separation context, there is some oversight guidance that appears
to protect a detainee’s access to sleep. Namely, the Army Field Manual 222.3 charges that care be taken to protect detainees from excessive noise,
dampness, and inadequate heat, light, ventilation.142 The manual also
requires that detainees be provided adequate bedding and blankets.
Most notable with regard to sleep, however, is that when describing the
oversight conditions for the separation method, Appendix M of Army Field
Manual 2-22.3 states that “[u]se of separation must not preclude the detainee
getting four hours of continuous sleep every 24 hours.”143 This is the only
reference to detainee sleep in the entire field manual. It informs the reader
that the minimum amount of continuous sleep that a detainee is allotted is
only four hours within a twenty-four-hour period.144

135. Id. at M-2.
136. Id. at M-2–M-3.
137. Id. at M-3.
138. Id.
139. Id. at M-3–M-4.
140. Id. at M-3.
141. Id. at M-9.
142. Id. at M-10.
143. Id.
144. The manual is silent on whether a detainee may be given the opportunity to sleep for only
four hours at the start of one twenty-four-hour period and four hours at the end of the next twentyfour-hour period (thus allowing for a forty-hour interval between sleep). That being said, a White
House report on the United States’ use of military force and national security measures indicates
that this is not permitted. See THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 123, at 58 n.205.
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C. Reports of Current Practices
Despite Army Field Manual 2-22.3 being accessible to the public,
evidence of the actual interrogative and punitive practices of the United
States’ military and intelligence agencies is scant and cloaked in secrecy.
While Executive Order 13,491 shuttered CIA black sites, the U.S. military
maintains its own carceral facilities on bases abroad, including Guantanamo
Bay.145 Additionally, there are opportunities for U.S. investigators to
interrogate detainees held in third country-operated facilities.146 Despite
accessibility obstacles, multiple unverified reports of sleep interruption and
sleep deprivation have emerged from Guantanamo Bay Detention Center.
Notably, these reports do not suggest adherence to the guidelines of Army
Field Manual.
In 2013, British Detainee Shaker Aamer reported that a Guantanamo
guard admitted to him that he was following orders by making as much noise
as possible as detainees tried to sleep.147 In a letter, Aamer wrote: “They
crashed the doors maybe 250 to 300 times in the night, keeping us awake,
and continued until around 9am – then quiet.”148
In 2016, Ramzi bin al Shibh, a Yemini national accused of taking part
in the September 11th plot, reported that he had been the continuous target
of a sleep deprivation campaign.149 On February 24, 2016, Bin al Shibh
testified that he was subjected to constant noises and vibrations, including
fence-banging from the recreation yard, buzzing sounds, vibrations from his
bed when he was trying to sleep, vibrations on the floor when he stood to
pray, and vibrations in his seat when he tried to read.150 During questioning,
Bin al Shibh’s attorney elicited testimony from his client that he also heard
“bird noises” and moved to enter into evidence a memorandum stating that
Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp had been fitted with devices enabling the
camp to broadcast artificial bird noises.151 Bin al Shibh described the
vibrations as “like sitting in the car while the . . . engine machine is on . . . it
145. Mark Urban, The Nature of President Obama’s Rendition Programme, BBC NEWS (Sept.
9, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-14862161.
146. Id.
147. Mark Townsend, Guantánamo Guards ‘Forcing Inmates to Stay Awake,’ GUARDIAN (July
6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/07/guantanamo-guards-inmates-stayawake.
148. Id.
149. Carol Rosenberg, Alleged 9/11 Plotter Testifies: Guantánamo Noises, Vibrations are Real,
They Drugged Me for Protesting, MIA. HERALD (Feb. 24, 2016, 6:15 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/guantanamo/article62287467.html.
150. Id.
151. Id.; Helen Klein Murillo, 2/24 Session: The “Bird Noises and Vibrations” Edition,
LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2016, 3:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/224-session-bird-noises-andvibrations-edition.
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is very annoying, very destructive . . . if they just do it in very low level, it’s
bad. If they put it up, you can . . . go crazy.”152 He further reported that the
constant sound rendered him unable to sleep, unable to focus, and unable to
work with his defense team on his case.153 During cross-examination he
indicated that he never had more than four to six hours of sleep without
disruption.154
In December of 2017, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Torture, Nils Melzer, rebuked the United States government in no uncertain
terms, stating that the ban on torture is absolute and without exception.155 He
highlighted the case of Guantanamo detainee Ammar al-Baluchi, stating that
“[h]is torture and ill-treatment are reported to continue.”156 He continued,
“[i]n addition to the long-term effects of past torture, noise and vibrations are
reportedly still being used against him, resulting in constant sleep deprivation
and related physical and mental disorders, for which he allegedly does not
receive adequate medical attention.”157
III. THE EFFECTS OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION
Indications of Mohammed Jawad’s declining mental health presented
themselves prior to his subjugation to sleep deprivation but became
considerably worse after he was denied requisite sleep. On September 3,
2003, seven months into his detention at Guantanamo Bay, Jawad was seen
talking to a poster on the wall.158 When an interrogator consulted a
psychologist from the Behavioral Science Consultation Team (“BSCT”),159
the psychologist noted that Jawad appeared frightened and looked “as if he
could easily break.”160 In an effort to exploit his vulnerabilities, the
psychologist recommended that Jawad be made as uncomfortable as
152. Murillo, supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. “US Must Stop Policy of Impunity for the Crime of Torture”– UN Rights Expert, U.N. HUM.
RTS.,
OFF.
OF
THE
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22532&LangID=E.
156. Miles, supra note 16.
157. Id. Pentagon spokesman, Major Ben Sakrisson, asserted that the allegation of forced sleep
deprivation was untrue, stating “[t]hese claims have been investigated on multiple occasions in the
past and no credible evidence has been found to substantiate his claims.” Id.
158. Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink & James Risen, How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged
Minds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/cia-tortureguantanamo-bay.html.
159. The Behavioral Science Consultation Team, or “BSCTs” (pronounced as ‘biscuit’),
engineered camp experiences using detainees’ psychological profiles to yield more fruitful
interrogations. M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors and Interrogators at Guantanamo
Bay, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 7 (2005).
160. Apuzzo et al., supra note 158.
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possible.161 After thirty days in isolation, Jawad was subjected to the
Frequent Flyer Program.162 On December 25, 2003, he attempted suicide.163
The physical and emotional effects that Mohammed Jawad suffered as
a result of sleep deprivation in Guantanamo Bay are difficult to disentangle
from multiple factors and variables, including being placed in isolation in
Guantanamo, his adolescence, the stresses of indefinite detention, as well as
prior traumas he suffered during his childhood while at a refugee camp164 and
at Bagram Prison.165 Furthermore, it is important to note that while
associations (e.g., that Jawad attempted suicide after prolonged sleep
deprivation) can certainly suggest causation (e.g., that Jawad’s prolonged
sleep deprivation caused his mental decline and suicide attempt), they are not
conclusive.
Moreover, it is difficult to discern the empirical physiological and
psychological impact of forced sleep deprivation when confounded with
other interrogation tactics.
In 2009, Susan Crawford, the Bush
Administration’s appointed authority of the Military Commission, criticized
the interrogation tactics applied on Mohammed Al-Qahtani, a Saudi Arabian
citizen alleged to be an al-Qaeda operative, as torture.166 Crawford remarked:
You think of torture, you think of some horrendous physical act
done to an individual. This was not any one particular act; this was
just a combination of things that had a medical impact on him, that
hurt his health. It was abusive and uncalled for. And coercive.
Clearly coercive. It was that medical impact that pushed me over
the edge” to call it torture.167

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Prison logs described two different accounts of Mohammed Jawad’s suicide attempt on the
evening of December 25, 2003. Frakt, Closing Argument, supra note 8, at 9 n.32. One indicates
that he was banging his head on metal structures inside his cell. Id. Another entry indicates that he
attempted to use the collar of his shirt to hang himself. Id. Mohammed Jawad reportedly attempted
suicide on more than one occasion per his detainee records. Vandeveld, supra note 5.
164. Mohammed Jawad’s father reportedly died in the Afghan Civil War after the Soviet
occupation. AMNESTY INT’L, AMR 51/091/2008, FROM ILL-TREATMENT TO UNFAIR TRIAL: THE
CASE OF MOHAMMED JAWAD, CHILD ‘ENEMY COMBATANT’ (2008). As a result, his family was
forced to flee to a refugee camp in Pakistan. Id. He was later reportedly kicked out of his mother’s
home by his stepfather when he was still a child. Id.
165. After being turned over to U.S. Special Forces on December 17, 2002, Mohammed Jawad
was transported to a U.S. airbase in Bagram for seven weeks. Id. There, he was interrogated and
subjected to isolation, sleep deprivation, use of restraints, hooding, forced standing, stress positions,
and physical assaults. Id.
166. Bob Woodward, Guantanamo Detainee Was Tortured, Says Official Overseeing Military
Trials,
WASH.
POST
(Jan
14,
2009),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372.html.
167. Id.
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Sleep deprivation and interruption presented themselves in varying
durations, through a range of means, and as part of a combination of enhanced
interrogation tactics employed in Guantanamo Bay and at CIA black sites.
But the medical impact on its subjects was notable.
Scientists have yet to find a satisfying answer to the question of why
human beings sleep.168 But the value of sleep is clear. One need only have
one bad night of sleep to recognize physiological and cognitive effects. The
average adult is said to require around eight hours of sleep a night169 and the
Center for Disease Control recommends that adults from the ages of eighteen
through sixty get at least seven hours of quality sleep each night.170 More
recently, the broader medical community has studied some of the
psychological and physiological effects and associations of insufficient sleep
in order to quantify and qualify the impact.
A. Sleep Deprivation Defined
The term sleep deprivation is used to describe a failure to obtain the
necessary amount or quality of sleep.171 The recommendation for sufficient
sleep has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Normal and healthy sleep
requires an adequate duration, good quality, appropriate timing, regularity,
and the absence of sleep disturbances and disorders.172 One night without
any sleep is termed total deprivation, whereas disrupted sleep describes
interrupted periods of sleep.173 Clinically, disrupted sleep can be used to

168. Why Do We Sleep?, 3 NATURE NEUROSCI. 1225, 1225 (2000) [hereinafter Sleep, NATURE
NEUROSCI.]; Div. of Sleep Med. at Harvard Med. Sch., Why Do We Sleep Anyway, HEALTHY SLEEP
(Dec. 18, 2007) https://healthysleep.med.harvard.edu/healthy/matters/benefits-of-sleep/why-dowe-sleep; Pallab Ghosh, Why Do We Sleep?, BBC NEWS (May 15, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-32606341; Stephanie Pappas, Why Do We Sleep?,
LIVE SCI. (Jul 18, 2017), https://www.livescience.com/32469-why-do-we-sleep.html.
169. Sleep, NATURE NEURO., supra note 168, 1225. There are Natural Short Sleepers
(individuals who biologically require only four to six hours a night) and Natural Long Sleepers
(individuals who biologically require nine to ten hours a night). Ying-Hui Fu, Investigating
Genetics
of
Human
Natural
Short
Sleepers
(IGHNSS),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/cgi-bin/study.cgi?study_id=phs001270.v1.p1. Natural
Short Sleepers, or as they’re called “super sleepers,” make up only 1–3% of the population. Michael
J. Breus, Could You Be a Super Sleeper?, PSYCH. TODAY (Apr. 19, 2011),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/sleep-newzzz/201104/could-you-be-super-sleeper.
170. How Much Sleep Do I Need?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/sleep/about_sleep/how_much_sleep.html (Mar. 2, 2017) (citing Nathaniel F.
Watson et al., Recommended Amount of Sleep for a Healthy Adult: A Joint Consensus Statement of
the American Academy of Sleep Medicine and Sleep Research Society, 38 SLEEP 843, 843 (2015)).
171. Goran Medic, Micheline Wille & Michiel EH Hemels, Short- and Long-Term Health
Consequences of Sleep Disruption, 9 NATURE & SCI. SLEEP 151, 152 (2017).
172. Id. at 151 (citing Nathaniel F. Watson et al., supra note 170, at 843–44).
173. Id. at 152; see also Carol A. Everson, Bernard M. Bergmann & Allan Rechtschaffen, Sleep
Deprivation in the Rat: III. Total Sleep Deprivation, 12 SLEEP 13, 13 (1989).
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describe sleep fragmentation, difficulty maintaining sleep, or insomnia.174
Sleep disturbances include disorders of falling or staying asleep, excessive
sleep, an abnormal sleep-wake schedule, dysfunctions of sleep, sleep stages,
or parasomnias (sleep disorders resulting in abnormal physical or verbal
behavior during sleep).175 Chronic short sleep is frequently sleeping six
hours or less a night.176 Chronic sleep restriction is defined as habitually
sleeping more than four but less than seven hours a night.177 Where one does
not meet the nightly requisite of sleep over periods of time, they are said to
accumulate sleep debt.178
A complete sleep cycle involves passing through various sleep stages.
Sleep stages have historically been divided into one stage of rapid eye
movement (“REM”) and four stages of non-rapid eye movement
(“NREM”).179 Each stage of NREM is characterized by an increase in sleep
depth.180
B. The Cognitive and Psychological Effects of Sleep Deprivation
A wide range of research demonstrates that there is a “complex
bidirectional relationship between chronic insomnia and . . . psychiatric
disorders.”181 For example, this relationship exists between sleep disturbance
and depression (e.g., evidence suggests that sleep disturbance is a symptom
of depression, but also that sleep deprivation affects the course and clinical

174. Medic et al., supra note 171, at 152.
175. René E. Cormier, Sleep Disturbances, in SLEEP DISTURBANCES, CLINICAL METHODS: THE
HISTORY, PHYSICAL, AND LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS 398, 398 (H. Kenneth Walker, W. Dallas
Hall & J. Willis Hurst eds., 1990); Parasomnias & Disruptive Sleep Disorders, CLEVELAND CLINIC
(Apr. 29, 2021), https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/12133-parasomnias—disruptivesleep-disorders.
176. Zhengqing Zhao, Xiangxiang Zhao & Sigrid C. Veasey, Neural Consequences of Chronic
Short Sleep: Reversible or Lasting?, 8 FRONTIERS NEUROLOGY (May 31, 2017),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fneur.2017.00235/full#:~:text=on%20neurobehaviora
l%20performance.,Chronic%20Short%20Sleep%20(CSS)%20in%20Humans%20is%20Commonly%20Observed,40
%20million%20individuals%20(1).
177. Christopher A. Magee et. al., Examining the Pathways Linking Chronic Sleep Restriction
to
Obesity,
J.
OBESITY
(Feb.
16,
2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2925323/#:~:text=Chronic%20sleep%20restrictio
n%20is%20generally,nor%20chronic%20condition%20in%20humans.
178. Countering the Effects of Chronic Sleep Loss, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G: HARV. MED. SCH.
(July 2, 2007), https://www.health.harvard.edu/press_releases/repaying-sleep-debt.
179. Medic et. al., supra note 171, at 152.
180. Id.
181. PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS. & HUM. RTS. FIRST, LEAVE NO MARKS: ENHANCED
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AND THE RISK OF CRIMINALITY 23 n.193 (2007) [hereinafter LEAVE
NO MARKS].
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outcome of the depression).182 Additionally, sleep deprivation is associated
with an increased risk of suicidal ideation and suicide.183
Sleep deprivation that occurred in Guantanamo prior to 2009 was
associated with severe psychological harm.184 A 2011 study of nine
Guantanamo detainees’ medical records, client affidavits, attorney-client
notes, and legal affidavits of medical experts concluded that both the physical
and psychological maladies suffered by the nine detainees evidenced torture
as a result of the enhanced interrogation techniques.185 All nine detainees in
the study reported being subjected to sleep deprivation.186 None of the
detainees in the study had any past history of psychological issues or family
history of psychological problems prior to detention at Guantanamo Bay.187
Eight of the nine detainees displayed significant psychological symptoms
including: nightmares (five), suicidal ideation (four), depression (two),
audiovisual hallucinations (three), suicide attempts (two), anxiety or
claustrophobia (two), memory and concentration difficulties (one), and
dissociative states (two).188 In each case, the onset of these symptoms was
contemporaneous with allegations of abuse.189 Department of Defense
mental health providers evaluated six of the nine detainees and diagnosed
them with the following: depression (four), passive aggressive personality
(four), borderline personality (two), adjustment disorder (three), routine
stressors of confinement (two), narcissistic traits (one), psychosis or
depression with psychotic features (two), and anxiety (two).190 Seven of the
nine detainees had symptoms supporting a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder.191 “The medical evaluations in this case series revealed evidence

182. See id. at 23 n.194 (explaining that the authors of a study “suggest that insomnia in young
men is indicative of a greater risk for subsequent clinical depression and psychiatric distress that
persists for at least 30 years”).
183. Id.; see also Michael Billiard & Alison Bentley, Is Insomnia Best Categorized as a Symptom
or a Disease?, 5 SLEEP MED. SUPP. 1, S1, S35 (2004); see generally Naomi Breslau et al., Sleep
Disturbance and Psychiatric Disorders: A Longitudinal Epidemiological Study of Young Adults, 39
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 411 (1996); Mehmed Yücel Ağargün, Hayrettin Kara & Mustafa
Solmaz, Sleep Disturbances and Suicidal Behavior in Patients with Major Depression, 58 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 249 (1997); P.P. Chang et al., Insomnia in Young Men and Subsequent
Depression, The Johns Hopkins Precursors Study, 146 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 105 (1997).
184. Vincent Iacopino & Stephen N. Xenakis, Neglect of Medical Evidence of Torture in
Guantanamo Bay: A Case Series, 8 PLOS MED. Apr. 2011, at 1, 1.
185. Id. at 3–4. The investigators of the study rely on both the CAT definition of torture as well
as the interpretation of torture memorialized in the August 1, 2002 Bybee memorandum. Id.
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id. at 3.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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of . . . severe and prolonged psychological pain as stipulated in the Bybee
definition of torture.”192
The study is suggestive of the effects that more extreme versions of
sleep deprivation can have on a detainee, but it is not conclusive. The
detainees in this study were subjected to a variety of enhanced interrogation
techniques, so any effects of sleep deprivation could be confounded by any
one or a combination of the enhanced interrogation methods. That being said,
sleep deprivation was the only enhanced interrogation technique that every
detainee in this study experienced and was thus a common variable across
the nine detainees. And there are several studies that demonstrate the effects
that a lack of sleep alone can have on one’s psyche.193
The effects of total deprivation are understood to be particularly
detrimental.194 But experts in sleep medicine have come to study the effects
that sleep debt and chronic sleep restriction, or chronic short sleep, yield over
time. For example, a 2003 study tracked the effects of forty-eight healthy
adults’ neurobehavioral and cognitive performances when their sleep was
restricted to eight hours, six hours, or four hours of sleep a night for fourteen
days.195 The study also tested what the effects of total sleep deprivation
would be for three nights.196 While subjects sleeping eight hours a night
remained essentially behaviorally alert over the course of fourteen days,
“subjects in the [four-hour] sleep period condition displayed escalating
numbers of lapses in behavioral alertness and decreasing cognitive accuracy
and speed across the 14 days.”197 Subjects in the six-hour sleep period
demonstrated a magnitude of negative changes in performance each day that
was more than the eight-hour sleepers, but less than the four-hour sleepers.198
Additionally, after fourteen days, the four-hour sleepers demonstrated lapses
in behavioral alertness and reductions in working memory performance at
levels equivalent to those observed after two nights without any sleep and
their cognitive performance was equivalent to that of one night without

192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Zhao et al., supra note 176; Breslau et al., supra note 183; Aargun et al., supra
note 183; Chang et al., supra note 183; Amy Reynolds & Siobhan Banks, Total Sleep Deprivation,
Chronic Sleep Restriction and Sleep Disruption, in 185 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 91 (Gerard
A. Kerkhof & Hans P.A. van Dongen eds., 2010).
194. For example, a seminal 1989 study subjected ten lab rats to total sleep deprivation which
led to the death or imminent death of all ten rats within eleven to thirty-two days. Everson et al.,
supra note 173, at 13.
195. Hans P.A. Van Dongen et al., The Cumulative Cost of Additional Wakefulness: DoseResponse Effects on Neurobehavioral Functions and Sleep Physiology from Chronic Sleep
Restriction and Total Sleep Deprivation, 26 SLEEP 117, 117 (2003).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 120.
198. Id.
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sleep.199 The six-hour sleepers demonstrated impairment of behavioral
alertness and working memory performance equivalent to one night of total
sleep loss.200 The study suggested that “even relatively moderate sleep
restriction—if sustained night after night—can seriously impair waking
neurobehavioral functions in healthy young adults.”201 It further concluded
that “the effects of sleep chronically limited to [four hours] and [six hours]
per night on cognitive performance appear to reflect progressive
neurocognitive dysfunction in systems underlying sustained attention and
working memory.”202
The effects of chronic restricted sleep are psychological and
physiological in nature. After one week of shortened sleep (six hours or less),
a healthy adult’s cumulative impairments in vigilance, or alertness, are so
profound that even three consecutive nights of full recovery sleep is
insufficient.203 Further, an incomplete recovery in vigilance increases the
likelihood of long-term injury.204 A 2018 study found that chronic short sleep
in mice in early adulthood sped up the onset of motor impairment and yielded
a greater loss of neurons in the locus coeruleus (the brain region critical for
optimal cognitive performance and brain health) and the lateral amygdala.205
The damage to these neurons and disfunctions in these areas of the brain is
implicated in depression and Alzheimer’s disease.206 Notably, even with an
extended opportunity for recovery after chronic short sleep, the mice showed
a toxic and sustained increase in a protein (pathogenic tau) associated with
Alzheimer’s disease.207 More simply, even after the chronic sleep restriction
ended, the tau protein continued to accumulate in the mouse’s brain.208 This
study is not only suggestive of the dangerous impact of frequently sleeping
six hours a night or less, but that the effects are long-lasting. Even
intermittent short sleep (short sleep over the course of four days a week) has
yielded lasting consequences on neurons essential for alertness, mood, brain
health, optimal cognitive performance, and goal-driven behaviors even with
extended sleep recovery periods.209

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 124.
202. Id.
203. Zhao et al., supra note 176, at 2.
204. Id.
205. Yan Zhu et al., Chronic Sleep Disruption Advances the Temporal Progression of Tauopathy
in P301S Mutant Mice, 38 J. NEUROSCI. 10255 (2018).
206. Zhao et al., supra note 176, at 4.
207. Id.; Zhu et al., supra note 205.
208. Zhu et al., supra note 205.
209. Yan Zhu et al., Intermittent Short Sleep Results in Lasting Sleep Wake Disturbances and
Degeneration of Locus Coeruleus and Orexinergic Neurons, 39 SLEEP 1601, 1601–11 (2016).
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Theoretically, one can “pay back” certain forms of sleep debt with
recovery sleep.210 However, there is a “point of no return,” so to speak, where
the effects of sleep deprivation will have a lasting negative impact regardless
of the amount of recovery sleep.211 Furthermore, a lack of sleep need not last
a lifetime to be destructive in the long-term. Specifically, in a 1996 study on
sleep disturbances and psychiatric disorders in young adults, the authors
argue that complaints of insomnia nearly every night for two weeks or more
may be a useful indicator of a later onset of major depression.212
Additionally, a 1997 long-term study on insomnia in men in medical school
found a greater risk of clinical depression for those who reported insomnia
compared with those who did not.213 Notably, “[t]he authors suggest that
insomnia in young men is indicative of a greater risk for subsequent clinical
depression and psychiatric distress that persists for at least 30 years.”214
While forced sleep deprivation and insomnia are different bases for a lack of
sleep, the conditions are likely to cause similar effects on the human body.215
When interviewed in the course of this Article’s research, Dr. Sigrid Veasey,
Professor of Medicine at the Perelman School of Medicine at the University
of Pennsylvania, remarked that:
To date the long-term effects of chronic partial sleep loss for 30
days of short sleep (4 hours/day) have not been studied in humans
and thus are not known. However[,] based on previous studies,
such a pattern would lead to significant impairment in vigilance
and mood across the month of sleep loss, leaving as a larger
unknown how reversible these impairments are long-term. From
animal model studies there are indeed lasting effects on the brain,
including memory impairments and loss of select neurons critical
for memory.216
The research on sleep deprivation, sleep debt, and disrupted sleep is,
understandably, of particular interest to the U.S. military, which itself has a

210. A 1997 study concluded, among other findings, that recovery from the effects of sleep
restriction to nearly five hours a night for seven days required two nights of recovery sleep. David
F. Dinges et al., Cumulative Sleepiness, Mood Disturbance, and Psychomotor Vigilance
Performance Decrements During a Week of Sleep Restricted to 4–5 Hours per Night, 20 SLEEP 267,
276 (1997); Molly Webster, Can You Catch Up on Lost Sleep?, SCI. AMERICAN (May 6, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fact-or-fiction-can-you-catch-up-on-sleep/.
211. See Van Dongen et al., supra note 195, at 124.
212. LEAVE NO MARKS, supra note 181, at 23 (citing Breslau et al., supra note 183).
213. Id. at 23 n.194 (citing Chang et al., supra note 183).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. E-mail from Sigrid Veasey, M.D., Professor of Med., Univ. of Pa., to Deena N. Sharuk,
Clinical Teaching Fellow & Supervising Att’y, Ctr. for Applied Legal Stud. (CALS), Geo. Univ. L.
Ctr. (July 24, 2020, 6:25 PM) (on file with author).
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culture of insufficient sleep amongst its personnel.217 The implications of
insufficient sleep with respect to maintaining the health and performance of
soldiers has led leadership to challenge this sleep-restricted culture.218 A
2000 study conducted at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research found
that short-term total sleep deprivation produces a global decrease in brain
activity with reductions in activity mediating attention and other “higherorder cognitive processes.”219 In 2013, the Uniformed Services University,
the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, and Walter Reed National
Military Medical Center sponsored a symposium on Psychiatry and Sleep
Disorders.220 During Dr. Christopher Lettieri’s remarks on sleep issues in the
military population, he discussed sleep debt in military personnel.221 He
explained how chronic sleep restriction leads to attention deficit disorder and
deactivates the prefrontal cortex, stating:
The prefrontal cortex overlaps a bit with our personality. This is
why chronic sleep debt or even acute sleep debt leads to irritability
and moodiness. It impacts who we are and how we function.
Chronic sleep restriction decreases your ability to perform
complex mental operations leading to a decreased quality of life.
Sleep deprivation impacts both mood and health. . . . Inadequate
sleep is associated with an increased risk of psychiatric disorders
especially depression, irritability, anxiety, and alcohol disorders.222
As part of its campaign to encourage more sleep in military personnel,
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research released a piece on fighting soldier

217. Chistopher Lettieri, Sleep Issues in the Military Population, in ARTISS SYMPOSIUM 2013:
PSYCHIATRY
AND
SLEEP
DISORDERS
29
(2013),
https://www.cstsonline.org/assets/media/documents/Artiss_Report_2013.pdf;
see
generally
Cameron H. Good et al., Sleep in the United States Military, 45 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
176 (2020).
218. See Good et al., supra note 217.
Cognitive dominance is critical for success in the battlefield of today and tomorrow.
Sleep is ammunition for the brain, necessary for the maintenance of sustained vigilance
and cognitive dominance,” [Army Lt. Col. (Dr.) Vincent] Capaldi said. “We would never
send service members into the field and say they don’t need to bring water along with
them, so we have to reverse the culture within our military that views sleep as a liability
instead of an asset to help service members keep their brains in the fight.
Mil. Health Sys. Commc’ns Off., MHS Addresses Sleep in the Military Through Sleep Studies,
HEALTH.MIL (July 20, 2020), https://www.health.mil/News/Articles/2020/07/20/MHS-addressessleep-in-the-military-through-sleep-studies.
219. Maria Thomas et al., Neural Basis of Alertness and Cognitive Performance Impairments
During Sleepiness. I. Effects of 24 h of Sleep Deprivation on Waking Human Regional Brain
Activity, 9 J. SLEEP RSCH. 335, 335, 349 (2000).
220. ARTISS SYMPOSIUM 2013: PSYCHIATRY AND SLEEP DISORDERS, supra note 217.
221. Id. at 29. Christopher J. Lettieri M.D. is an Assistant Deputy Commander for Medicine and
the Director of the Sleep Medicine Fellowship Program at Walter Reed National Military Medical
Center. Id. at 63.
222. Id. at 30–31.
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fatigue and “enhancing cognitive dominance.”223 The publication noted that
62% of soldiers are chronically sleep restricted, averaging less than six hours
of sleep per night.224 Further, it also found that five nights with less than five
hours of sleep creates a 20% cognitive deficiency equivalent to a .08 blood
alcohol level (or five alcoholic drinks in a 180-pound male).225 Additionally,
the report explained that soldiers who averaged less than six hours of sleep
every twenty-four hours are 4.7 times more likely to develop PTSD and 11.4
times more likely to develop depression than soldiers who average more than
six hours of sleep.226
The 2016 Army Technique Publication ATP-6-22.5, “A Leader’s Guide
to Solider Health and Fitness,” developed by the Office of the Army Surgeon
General, has an entire section dedicated to sleep as part of the “Performance
Triad.”227 The authors note the insufficiency of four hours of sleep per night,
writing:
It is commonly thought that adequate levels of performance can be
maintained with only 4 hours of sleep per 24 hours. In fact, after
obtaining 4 hours of sleep per night for 5 to 6 consecutive nights a
Soldier experiences the same impairment as if he had stayed awake
continuously for 24 hours.228
The authors note that “[s]leep loss may result in the impairment of
mental and physical activities”229 and further instructs leadership that the
“best way to evaluate a Soldier’s sleep status is to observe his behavior.
Indications of sleep loss include, but are not limited to, increased errors,
irritability, . . . difficulty understanding information, attention lapses,
decreased initiative and motivation, and decreased attention to personal
hygiene.”230 In fact, studies have shown that combat effectiveness, evidenced
by cognitive performance, marksmanship decrements, and musculoskeletal
symptoms, is reduced to 15% total effectiveness for soldiers who get only 4
hours of sleep per night.231

223. Fighting Soldier Fatigue & Enhancing Cognitive Sleep Dominance, WRAIR’S
INVESTIGATOR’S
DISPATCH,
https://www.wrair.army.mil/sites/default/files/201906/Behavioral_Health_and_Sleep.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
224. Id. at 3.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ATP 6-22.5, A LEADER’S GUIDE TO SOLDIER HEALTH AND FITNESS
2-1 (2016) [hereinafter ATP 6-22.5]; see also Good et al., supra note 217, at 176–91.
228. ATP 6-22.5, supra note 227, at 2-6.
229. Id. at 2-5.
230. Id. at 2-6.
231. Good et al., supra note 217, at 184 (citations omitted).
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C. Physiological Effects
When discussing sleep deprivation, much of the attention is dedicated
to its psychological effects, however the consequences of sleep deprivation
include physiological burdens in addition to cognitive and emotional costs.
Sleep is a necessary component for brain function and systemic physiology
including the immune, hormonal, and cardiovascular systems.232
Sleep restriction of four hours per night for less than a week can result
in hypertension, cardiovascular disease, altered glucose tolerance, and insulin
resistance.233 Further, four hours of sleep a night can aggravate conditions
like hypertension. In a 1999 study, researchers in Italy monitored thirty-six
patients with hypertension during a night where they only slept for four hours
and again one week later.234 They found that blood pressure and heart rate
were higher during the sleep deprivation periods than they were during a
routine night of sleep and that those readings remained elevated at noon the
day after a sleep-deprived night.235 Additionally, short sleep durations
(defined as five hours or less a night) are independently associated with
coronary events in women.236 Finally, sleep duration under six hours was
associated with high blood pressure, dyslipidemia, impaired glucose
tolerance and diabetes, being overweight or obese, impaired immune
function, heart disease, stroke, certain cancers, Alzheimer’s disease, and
death.237

232. Medic et al., supra note 171, at 151 (citing Nathaniel F. Watson et al., Joint Consensus
Statement of the American Academy of Sleep Medicine and Sleep Research Society on the
Recommended Amount of Sleep for a Healthy Adult: Methodology and Discussion, 38 SLEEP 1161
(2015)); see also INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, SLEEP DISORDERS AND SLEEP
DEPRIVATION: AN UNMET PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM (Harvey R. Colten & Bruce M. Altevogt
eds., 2006).
233. LEAVE NO MARKS, supra note 181, at 23 (citing G.G. Alvarez & N.T. Ayas, The Impact of
Daily Sleep Duration on Health: A Review of the Literature, 19 PROGRESS IN CARDIOVASCULAR
NURSING 56 (2004)).
234. Rebecca Voelker, Sleep and Hypertension, 281 JAMA 889 (1999).
235. Id.
236. See generally Najib T. Ayas et al., A Prospective Study of Sleep Duration and Coronary
Heart Disease in Women, 163 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 205 (2003).
237. See generally Sayuri Katano et al., Relationship Between Sleep Duration and Clustering of
Metabolic Syndrome Diagnostic Components, 4 DIABETES, METABOLIC SYNDROME AND OBESITY:
TARGETS & THERAPY 119 (2011); Dolores Buscemi et al., Short Sleep Times Predict Obesity in
Internal Medicine Clinic Patients, 3 J. CLINICAL SLEEP MED. 687 (2007); Fighting Soldier Fatigue
& Enhancing Cognitive Sleep Dominance, supra note 223.
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IV. SLEEP DEPRIVATION AS A FORM OF TORTURE
By its language alone, the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 permits a level of
sleep deprivation that rises to the level of torture under the domestic
definition of the word.238
A. The Army Field Manual’s Permissible Form of Sleep Deprivation Is
Likely to Yield Severe Mental Pain and Suffering
In Mohammed Jawad’s hearing on his motion to dismiss the charges
brought against him, the military commission found that while it was not
necessary to determine whether Mohammed Jawad had been tortured, the
Frequent Flyer Program, to which Jawad had been subjected from May 7–
20, 2004, was “calculated to profoundly disrupt his mental senses.”239 The
commission, however, offers little in the way of analysis to explain what it is
to “profoundly disrupt the senses.” That being said, even with scant official
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340, the language in the Army Field Manual
permits restricting a detainee’s sleep to four hours a night for thirty nights
(with the opportunity for renewal or repeating) and that actus reus
undoubtedly meets the definition of torture.240
David Luban and Katherine Newell divide the mental torture
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2340 into six elements: (1) specific intent to
cause (2) prolonged mental harm (3) resulting from (4) the administration or
application, or threatened administration or application, of procedures (5)
calculated (6) to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.241 In this
analysis, element four refers to the restriction of detainee sleep to four hours
a night for thirty nights. Luban and Newell argue that of the remaining five
elements, numbers five and six are the most critical because once they are
satisfied, so too are the first three elements.242 This is because once one has
proven profound disruption of the personality (6), they argue that one has
thus proven prolonged mental harm (2) and causation (3).243 Furthermore,
by proving the fifth element, “calculated,” one has proven specific intent
(1).244

238. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18.
239. Frakt, Closing Argument, supra note 8, at 21 (citing Ruling on Defense Motion to
Dismiss—Torture of the Detainee ¶ 13, Jawad (Mil. Comm’n, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed Sept.
24, 2008)).
240. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at A-30, M-10.
241. Luban & Newell, supra note 19, at 377.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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To establish that one has committed psychological torture, the actus
reus must profoundly disrupt the senses or personality.245 The term
“profound” is a qualitative measure of such a disruption.246 But there is no
modern case law that delves into what types of acts are calculated to
profoundly disrupt the senses or personality. That being said, the language
of the statute does shed light on what a profound disruption of the personality
means by its own construction. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 proscribes “the
administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality.”247 The implication is that the
procedures calculated to profoundly disrupt the senses or the personality
could be somehow analogous to threatening to administer a mind-altering
substance.
18 U.S.C. § 2340 offers no guidance on the meaning of “prolonged”
with respect to “prolonged mental harm” and there is scant guidance or case
law on how modern courts should interpret the term. With respect to
prolonged mental harm, the now repudiated Bybee Memorandum made clear
that mental disorders including chronic depression or post-traumatic stress
disorder, which could last for months or years, would meet such a
requirement of prolonged mental harm.248 This suggestion was also revised
to include developing mental disorders such as chronic depression or posttraumatic stress disorder that lasted for a term less than “months.”249
The harm caused by sleep deprivation by its very design disrupts
profoundly the senses and the personality. Medical studies demonstrate that
chronic sleep restriction (between four to six hours a night) for periods as
short as days, let alone weeks, negatively impact behavioral alertness, the
ability to pay attention, and decreased cognitive accuracy and memory
performance in its subjects.250 In fact, sleeping for less than five hours a night
for five consecutive nights yields the same effects of a .08 blood alcohol
content251 (the blood alcohol content at which it is illegal to drive in the
United States).252 Moreover, extended restricted sleep of this nature has
fostered toxic levels of proteins implicated in Alzheimer’s Disease and
245. Id. at 380.
246. Id. at 382.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(B).
248. Standards of Conduct Memo, supra note 69; see also Luban & Shue, supra note 19, at 333–
87.
249. Linda M. Keller, Is Truth Serum Torture, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 521, 554 (2005) (citing
Memorandum from Dep’t of Just. Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. Daniel Levin to Dep’t of Just. Deputy
Att’y Gen. James B. Comey (Dec. 30, 2004)).
250. See supra Part III.
251. Fighting Soldier Fatigue & Enhancing Cognitive Sleep Dominance, supra note 223, at 3.
252. 36 CFR § 4.23(a)(2).
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provoked regional neuron death implicated in depression.253 Provoking this
type of neurocognitive dysfunction is more than a disruption of the senses; it
blunts the subject’s senses and ability to function.
Chronic sleep restriction, even over limited periods, is further associated
with enduring psychiatric disorders including depression, irritability, anxiety,
and alcohol disorders.254 Impairing a subject with a mood disorder, such as
depression, is a profound disruption to the personality and prolonged mental
harm by even the lofty Bybee Memo’s standards. Depression causes severe
symptoms that affect how one thinks, feels, and handles daily activities such
as sleeping, eating, or working.255 An impact to emotional functioning and
mood is a clear disruption to the personality.
The medical studies on chronic sleep deprivation, discussed supra,
suggest that the aftereffects of days, let alone weeks, of chronic sleep are
likely to yield ongoing and prolonged mental harm for a subject. The OLC’s
assertion in its May 30, 2005, memorandum that the physiological reactions
as a result of sleep deprivation would “generally return to normal” with only
a night of sleep are unfounded. The OLC’s sources are a non-descript
literature review, representations from the CIA, and neuroscientist James
Horne’s 1988 book, Why We Sleep: The Functions of Sleep in Humans and
Other Mammals. In fact, even British sleep neuroscientist James Horne
himself took issue with the representation of his research.256 Horne stated,
“[t]o claim that 180 hours [of sleep deprivation] is safe in these respects, is
nonsense.”257 Horne and his colleagues who conducted the referenced sleep
study also took issue with the context in which subjects were being denied
sleep by the CIA, noting that prolonged stressors combined with sleep
deprivation would lead to physiological exhaustion of the body’s defense
mechanisms, physical collapse, and the potential for various ensuing
illnesses.258 Advances in sleep medicine and recent studies suggest that
chronic sleep restriction can cause lasting impacts such that the resulting
mental harm has not only the likelihood of existing for a prolonged period,

253. See Zhao et al., supra note 176, at 4; Telephone interview with Sigrid Veasey, M.D.,
Professor of Med., Univ. of Pa. (July 24, 2020).
254. ARTISS SYMPOSIUM 2013: PSYCHIATRY AND SLEEP DISORDERS, supra note 217, at 31.
255. Depression,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
MENTAL
HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/depression/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
256. Zachary Roth, Sleep Expert ‘Surprised and Saddened’ to Find Research Twisted in Torture
Memo,
TALKING
POINTS
MEMO
(Apr.
17,
2009,
10:03
AM)
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/sleep-expert-surprised-and-saddened-to-find-researchtwisted-in-torture-memo; Noah Shachtman, Sleep Scientists: Research Twisted to Justify Torture
(Updated), WIRED (Apr. 22, 2009, 11:44 AM), https://www.wired.com/2009/04/in-a-2005-memo/.
257. Shachtman, supra note 256 (alteration in original).
258. Id.
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but that the effects may be permanent.259 Studies of chronic short sleep in
mice even demonstrated a point of no return in cognitive decline.260 Chronic
restricted sleep for periods as short as two weeks are indicators for later onset
of major depression.261
Furthermore, sleep deprivation is destructive physiologically as well as
psychologically and causes harm that rises to the level of torture. An
individual subjected to sleep deprivation risks damage to the individual’s
physical health in various forms including elevated blood pressure,
cardiovascular disease, high cholesterol levels, weight gain, and obesity.262
More specifically, sleep restriction to just four hours a night—the precise
minimum dictated by Army Field Manual 2-22.3—for less than seven days
risks cardiovascular disease.263 Thus, four hours of sleep a night for thirty
days with the possibility of extension permits an interrogative or punitive
tactic that threatens one’s heart function. It is by its very nature severe in the
harm it produces.
B. The Army Field Manual’s Permitted Form of Sleep Deprivation
Meets the Specific Intent Requirement to Inflict Severe Physical and
Mental Pain and Suffering on a Detainee in U.S. Custody
A specific intent crime is one where an act is committed voluntarily and
purposefully with the mens rea to do something that the law forbids.264 With
regard to 18 U.S.C. § 2340, the act of torture requires that the actor
specifically intend to cause prolonged mental harm resulting from the
administration of procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality.265 As Luban and Newell have addressed, where one has proven
that the procedure is calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality,
one
has
proven
specific
intent.266
The argument that the psychological harm and profound disruption of
the senses are unintended outcomes of imposed partial sleep deprivation is
without merit. The drafters of the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 updated the
language to explicitly permit chronically restricting the sleep of detainees and
removed references to “abnormal sleep deprivation” as an example of mental

259. See generally Zhao et al., supra note 176; Zhu et al., supra note 209; Van Dongen et al.,
supra note 195.
260. See generally Zhao et al., supra note 176; Zhu et al., supra note 209; Van Dongen et al.,
supra note 195.
261. LEAVE NO MARKS, supra note 181, at 23.
262. See supra note 237.
263. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at M-10.
264. United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995).
265. Luban & Newell, supra note 19, at 377.
266. Id.
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torture. Furthermore, the actor need not intend mental harm to have specific
intent.267 Newell and Luban note:
An interrogator who intentionally breaks a subject’s arm cannot
defend herself by saying, “I intended to break his arm, but I didn’t
intend to harm him.” Breaking his arm is harming him. The
defense is mere wordplay: it denies specific intent to cause harm
solely on the basis that the actor does not call it harm.268
Even if the ends are to encourage compliance in interrogation or punish
alleged harms, the means are inflicting sleep deprivation that is calculated to
produce prolonged mental harm.269
The government would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that chronic
restricted sleep of four hours a night for thirty nights does not produce mental
harm or that they are somehow unaware of the likelihood. The U.S.
military’s own research on sleep deprivation demonstrates the destructive
outcomes of chronic restricted sleep and specifically advises against
restricting sleep to four hours a night.270 The Department of Defense knew,
and knows, that sleep deprivation would cause profound harm, yet it has
drafted guidance permitting the practice. The Department of Defense has
extensively studied and relied upon the research on the effects of chronic
sleep restriction.271 Thus, this manner of imposed harm is not incidental to
the process of interrogation; it is a calculated choice to permit its usage.
Additionally, sleep deprivation has no discernable connection to the
separation method’s suggested purpose of denying “the detainee the
opportunity to communicate with other detainees in order to keep him from
learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to
support a cover story.”272 In the absence of a plausible stated purpose, one
should consider the historic purpose of sleep deprivation: It is either intended
to punish the subject or it is intended to coerce cooperation in interrogation.
1. The U.S. Government’s Historical Criticism of Sleep Deprivation
as Torture
Speaking broadly, the U.S. government has not always regarded sleep
deprivation as permissible. In fact, the Department of Defense has
267. Id. at 381. Indeed, it is absurd to suggest that specific intent in the torture statute was in
regard to the reason for torturing someone. If that were the case, nearly every torturer would be
able to evade prosecution by suggesting that the intent was to encourage cooperation or to punish
the subject.
268. Luban & Newell, supra note 19, at 381.
269. See id.
270. Fighting Soldier Fatigue & Enhancing Cognitive Sleep Dominance, supra note 223.
271. ATP 6-22.5, supra note 227; see also Good et al., supra note 217, at 176–91; see generally
ARTISS SYMPOSIUM 2013: PSYCHIATRY AND SLEEP DISORDERS, supra note 217.
272. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at M-8; see infra Section IV.B.3.
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historically cataloged the practice as a form of torture. Perhaps the most
discouraging demonstration of the United States’ variable view on forced
sleep deprivation is the language in Army Field Manual 34-52 on Intelligence
Interrogation, the manual immediately preceding Army Field Manual 2-22.3.
Army Field Manual 34-52, issued in September of 1992, was superseded by
Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations
when the latter was issued on September 6, 2006 (nearly five years into the
War on Terror).273 Army Field Manual 34-52 defined torture and went so far
as to give examples of what would constitute torture:
Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating
the source’s free will, and are expressly prohibited by [the Geneva
Conventions] . . . . Torture is defined as the infliction of intense
pain to body or mind to extract a confession or information, or for
sadistic
pleasure. . . .
Examples
of
mental
torture
include . . . [a]bnormal sleep deprivation.”274
Four years into the War on Terror, army interrogators were permitted to
engage in interrogative tactics that were, by the terms of their own field
manual, designated as methods of torture.275
The Department of State has also decried the use of sleep deprivation as
torture. Each year, since 1977, the United States composes Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices, detailing the individual, civil, political, and
workers’ rights (as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other international agreements) in nations around the world.276 The
United States’ policy has been that it is fundamental to its interests to
“support a just peace around the world—one in which individuals, and not
just nations, are granted the fundamental rights they deserve.”277 In each
country’s report, freedom from torture is among the rights explored.
Paradoxically, the Department of State human rights reports prior to, during,
and since the War on Terror publicized the use of sleep deprivation as a

273. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at i.
274. FIELD MANUAL 34-52, supra note 128, at 1-8. The term “abnormal sleep deprivation” was
never defined in Army Field Manual 34-52 or prior versions of the Manual. Id.; see also DEP’T OF
THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1992); DEP’T OF THE ARMY,
FIELD MANUAL 30-15, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1978); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 30-15, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1969); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3016, TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (1953).
275. See generally FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18; see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, GETTING
AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES 57 (July
12, 2011), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e1c0c0b2.html.
276. Human
Rights
Reports,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
https://20092017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2022); see also Country Reports on
Human
Rights
Practices,
ONLINE
BOOKS
PAGE,
https://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=crhrp (last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
277. Human Rights Reports, supra note 276.
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method of torture when used by countries including Egypt (in the 2009, 2010,
and 2011 reports), Iran (in the 1999–2014 and 2016 reports), Jordan (in the
1993–2006 reports), Libya (in the 2002, 2003, and 2011 reports), Oman (in
the 1996, 1997, 2012–2016 reports), Peru (in the 1993–2000 reports), Tunisia
(in the 1996–2007, 2009, and 2010 reports), Turkey (in the 1993–2005, and
2007–2010 reports), Western Sahara (in the 2009 report), Yemen (in the
2004–2009 reports), and Zimbabwe (in the 2011–2016 reports).278 For
example, in the 2005 Human Rights Report on Jordan, sleep deprivation was
broadly classified as a form of torture: “The most frequently reported
methods of torture included . . . sleep deprivation . . . .”279 Notably, none of
the reports explicitly define the term “sleep deprivation.”
This double standard did not go unnoticed by the Department of Justice.
In 2005, the Department of Justice submitted a classified memorandum to the
CIA, writing:
Each year, in the State Department’s Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, the United States condemns coercive
interrogation techniques and other practices employed by other
countries. Certain of the techniques the United States has
condemned appear to bear some resemblance to some of the CIA
interrogation techniques . . . nudity, water dousing, sleep
deprivation, and food deprivation . . . .280
Courts in the United States have also acknowledged that sleep
deprivation can be considered torture. In deciding whether an immigrant
respondent is entitled to protections under the CAT, the Board of
Immigration Appeals found in 2002 that G-A-, an Iranian Christian of
Armenian descent, would likely face torture if he was deported to Iran.281
The court found, “that, if the respondent were arrested and detained upon his
return, his fate would likely include torture, as ‘there are numerous, credible
reports that security forces and prison personnel continue to torture detainees
and prisoners.’ Common methods of torture include ‘. . . sleep
deprivation . . . .’”282 The court did not elaborate on the circumstances
surrounding the respondent’s sleep deprivation.
The inconsistencies between U.S. policy, practice, and diplomacy not
only have the undesirable effect of appearing disingenuously sanctimonious
on a global stage but are also demonstrative of the fact that the United States

278. Id.
279. U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices
2005 – Jordan, REFWORLD (Mar. 8, 2006), https://www.refworld.org/docid/441821a334.html.
280. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 104, at 37 (alteration in original) (citing Article 16 CAT Memo,
supra note 74).
281. In re G-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 366, 370 (BIA 2002).
282. Id. (citation omitted).
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has historically identified sleep deprivation as a tool of torture and tacitly
permits its usage.
2. Sleep Deprivation Does Not Serve the Separation Method
It is disingenuous at best to argue that chronic sleep deprivation is an
unforeseen or incidental effect of the separation method. The separation
technique is employed for the purpose of preventing a detainee from
consorting with other detainees, exchanging information, and developing
counter-resistance strategies that could make interrogation less effective.283
Denying a detainee access to sufficient sleep does nothing in furtherance of
those goals.
In fact, sleep deprivation and sleep disruption are
counterproductive to intelligence gathering.284 So, what then is the purpose
of sleep deprivation in human intelligence collection? One need not
hypothesize for long as to the intent of an agent denying a detainee requisite
sleep. Prior usage of sleep deprivation techniques has been for the explicitly
stated purposes of reducing a detainee’s ability to think on their feet and to
coerce them to cooperate.285 Incentivizing cooperation or punishing an
individual with threatened or actual harm is the hallmark of torture.286 In
cases like Mohammed Jawad’s, where sleep deprivation was used without
any intelligence gathering, the act was punitive as opposed to coercive.
Additionally, if one were to give credence to the post-2009 reports from
Guantanamo, detainee statements make current practices of sleep deprivation
unlikely to be unintentional or incidental.287 Shaker Aamer’s complaint
regarding doors “crashing” up to three hundred times a night was reportedly
met with candor by a guard at Guantanamo who admitted that he was
following orders by making as much noise as possible as detainees tried to
sleep.288
3. The Implications of Reports of Sleep Deprivation in Guantanamo
After 2009
There are limited unverified reports suggesting that sleep deprivation is
ongoing in Guantanamo.289 If these reports are to be taken at face value, they
suggest a culture emboldened to employ sleep deprivation on detainees in a
punitive fashion. The detainees of Guantanamo are represented by counsel
and interrogation has largely ceased. As such, the intent behind sleep
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at M-8.
See infra Section V.B.3.
See Memo from Bybee to Rizzo, supra note 91.
See 18 U.S.C. §2340(2)(A); see also CAT, supra note 39, at ¶ 1.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.
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depriving detainees such as Ramzi bin al Shibh would have to be punitive.
Nevertheless, because the language of the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 renders
sleep deprivation permissible, it fosters a culture approving of a form of
torture.290
The argument that sleep deprivation in the form of chronic restricted
sleep of four hours a night for thirty nights is not currently practiced is
irrelevant. The current manual’s guidance is vulnerable to abuse. In its 2014
report to the United States, the U.N. Committee Against Torture stated:
[T]he Committee is concerned about certain aspects of Appendix
M of Army Field Manual No. 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, of 6 September 2006, in particular the
description of some authorized methods of interrogation, such as
the interrogation techniques of “physical separation” and “field
expedient separation”. While noting the information provided by
the delegation that such practices are consistent with the State
party’s obligations under the Convention, the Committee remains
concerned over the possibilities for abuse that such techniques may
entail (arts. 1, 2, 11 and 16).291
The Committee goes on to urge the United States to review Appendix
M of Army Field Manual No. 2-22.3 and, in particular, to abolish the
Separation Method, stating:
In particular . . . “use of separation must not preclude the detainee
getting four hours of continued sleep every 24 hours”. Such
provision, applicable over an initial period of 30 days, which may
be extended upon due approval, amounts to authorizing sleep
deprivation—a form of ill-treatment—, and is unrelated to the aim
of the “physical separation technique”, which is preventing
communication among detainees.292
History demonstrates that threats to national security allow for
exploitation of poorly defined laws and safeguards. Army Field Manual 222.3’s permissive regard for sleep deprivation is ripe for such exploitation
and, given its language regarding sleep restriction tactics, invites it.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Despite stated values to the contrary, the United States has a history of
engaging in torture.293 And while codifying anti-torture legislation, signing
290. See Field Manual 2-22.3, supra note 18, at M-10.
291. Concluding Observations, supra note 62, at ¶ 17.
292. Id.
293. USA and Torture: A History of Hypocrisy, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 9, 2014, 9:04 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/09/usa-and-torture-history-hypocrisy (listing examples of
when the United States engaged in tactics considered torture); Alfred W. McCoy, The U.S. Has a
History
of
Using
Torture,
HIST.
NEWS
NETWORK
(Oct.
19,
2007),

2022]

NO SLEEP FOR THE WICKED

739

on to international conventions interdicting torture, and offering guidance
limiting interrogation practices of foreign detainees are all steps toward
aligning those stated values with general practice, the risk remains that torture
will be an ongoing part of American legacy so long as safeguards remain
elusive and national security threats remain pervasive. Two conditions have
fostered an environment that continues to permit a practice that amounts to
torture: (1) a misguided belief that sleep deprivation is an effective tool in
human intelligence collection; and (2) a definition of torture so diluted and
narrow that when confronted with even rough-hewn argument, it yielded to
the weight of the enhanced interrogation techniques. As such, remedying this
failing requires: (1) doing away with any restriction on detainee sleep as
described in Army Field Manual 2-23.3;294 and (2) defining torture with
language and spirit that is more faithful to the Convention Against Torture.295
A. Doing Away with Restrictions on Detainee Sleep and, Instead,
Applying Efficient and Humane Intelligence Techniques
Because restricted sleep of even six hours a night for thirty nights has
the potential of yielding irreversible and severe cognitive, psychological, and
physiological damage, and because by its very nature, it has the likelihood of
yielding unreliable intelligence, sleep deprivation of any form should be
explicitly proscribed, as should any code or official guidance permitting it.
Eliminating sleep deprivation from the cache of interrogative methods
will not hinder intelligence collection (especially because sleep deprivation’s
effectiveness in interrogation is dubious at best). Army psychiatrist Major
Paul Burney and psychologist Major John Leso were both deployed to
Guantanamo where they were assigned to devise interrogation techniques
including manipulation of sleep.296 They warned that the techniques may
lead to physical and/or emotional harm.297 They added that the most effective
interrogation strategy was developing a bond with the subject.298

https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/32497 (same); The American Tradition of Torture, HARV.
UNIV. PRESS BLOG (May 11, 2018), https://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2018/05/theamerican-tradition-of-torture-fitzhugh-brundage.html (same); John T. Parry, Torture Nation,
Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1003–04, 1016 (2008) (same).
294. See infra Section V.A.
295. See infra Section V.B. For the sake of brevity, this Article does not wade into the debate
of whether a nation-state should engage in torture. It operates under the assumption that torture is
an ineffective means for interrogation, reputationally destructive, and morally repugnant, and as
such, the United States has no interest in engaging in torture.
296. Sheri Fink, Where Even Nightmares Are Classified: Psychiatric Care at Guantánamo, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/guantanamo-bay-doctorsabuse.html.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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Outside of Appendix M of Army Field Manual 2-22.3, the eighteen
Human Intelligence Collection techniques are effective tools for intelligence
collection.299 The Human Intelligence techniques include general approaches
such as the direct and incentive approaches, where the interrogator engages
in straightforward questioning or offers incentives to encourage cooperation
respectively.300 Field Manual 2-23.3 also contains seven emotional
approaches constructed to arouse strong negative or positive emotions from
the potential source in order to encourage cooperation. For example, the
emotional hate approach encourages the source’s hatred or desire for revenge
against others as a motivator for cooperation.301 There are nine additional
approaches including the we-know-all approach where the interrogator
pretends to already possess all of the relevant facts and gives the subject the
impression that he or she will only confirm or deny the information.302 In a
2014 study, participants were induced to cheat on a test and were later
accused of cheating and interrogated using Field Manual 2-22.3’s
unrestricted methods.303 Participants in both the negative emotional
approaches and the positive emotional approaches provided more
information and were more likely to confess than participants questioned
with the direct approach.304 Additionally, the negative and positive emotional
approaches yielded comparable results.305
Ultimately, Field Manual 2-22.3 possesses fruitful interrogational
approaches that do not risk the subject’s physical or mental health in the
process of intelligence collection, as discussed infra. Eliminating sleep
deprivation as a permitted practice will not compromise intelligence
collection efforts, just as the group of military and intelligence interrogators
highlighted in their November 16, 2010, letter to Secretary of Defense Robert
M. Gates.306

299. See Misty C. Duke, et al., The Effectiveness of Army Field Manual Interrogation
Approaches for Educing Information and Building Rapport, 42 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 442, 455–56
(2018).
300. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at M-6–M-7.
301. Id. at 8-10; See Duke et al., supra note 299, at 443.
302. FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, supra note 18, at 8-14.
303. Jacqueline R. Evans et al., An Empirical Evaluation of Intelligence-gathering Interrogation
Techniques from the United States Army Field Manual, 28 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 867, 869–
70 (2014).
304. Id. at 873.
305. Id.
306. Letter from Frank Anderson et al., to U.S. Sec’y of Def. Robert M. Gates (Nov. 16, 2010).
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B. Defining Torture with Fidelity to the Convention Against Torture
Of the eighty-three signatories, the United States presented the most
reservations to the Convention Against Torture.307
Further, in its
reservations, the United States diluted the definition of torture and refused to
criminalize cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.308 The
United States reportedly made these reservations as a protective measure to
shield domestic law enforcement from prosecution and to avoid
constitutional challenges for vagueness.309 Nonetheless, statutory language
that holds up against constitutional challenges and adheres to the
internationally recognized definition of torture are not mutually exclusive.
To remedy the shortcomings of the U.S. federal torture statute, this Article
proposes the following changes to the definition of torture: (1) clarify the
specific intent language—that an individual accused of torture must
knowingly inflict pain or suffering for a proscribed purpose; and (2) eliminate
the narrow definition of mental torture. Both recommendations can be
accomplished by redefining torture with language that is more faithful to the
Convention’s Article 1 definition.310
Though since repudiated,311 the OLC, through the Bybee memorandum,
attempted to obfuscate the required mens rea of 18 U.S.C. § 2340 by
exploiting its ambiguous specific intent language.312 This was made possible
by the elimination of the language describing the Convention’s list of
purposes for which one causes harm. The Convention specifies that torture
is perpetrated when the act of severe pain or suffering is intentionally
inflicted on another for such purposes as, for example, obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession.313 As Hathaway, Nowlan, and
Spiegel highlight, the U.N. Committee Against Torture and U.S. courts have
historically presumed intent based on the facts and circumstances:
Put simply, where the facts show that severe pain or suffering was
knowingly inflicted on a person with the acquiescence of a public
official for a purpose prohibited by the Convention, the Committee
concludes that the intent requirement is satisfied. In no instance
has the Committee considered it necessary to conduct an intent
analysis separate from its examination of these facts and
307. See note 48 and accompanying text.
308. See note 48 and accompanying text.
309. Hearing, supra note 45, at 12–13 (statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Mark Richard).
310. See infra Section I.B.
311. Memorandum from Dep’t of Just. Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. Daniel Levin to Dep’t of
Just. Deputy Att’y Gen. James B. Comey 2 (Dec. 30, 2004).
312. See Standards of Conduct Memo, supra note 69, at 3. The Bybee memo stated, “a defendant
[must] act with the specific intent to inflict severe pain” and added that “the infliction of such pain
must be the defendant’s precise objective.” Id.
313. CAT, supra note 39, at ¶ 1.
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circumstances. The Committee has applied a similar approach in
its concluding observations to country reports and country-specific
inquiries. In this context, the Committee has detailed a list of acts
that constitute torture, such as prolonged sleep deprivation and
violent shaking, from which intent can be inferred.314
By relying on a definition of torture that is more faithful to the U.N.
Convention Against Torture, the ambiguous language of specific intent as it
stands in 18 U.S.C. § 2340 is more difficult to manipulate and does not
deviate from the modern American understanding of torture. The language
of the CAT and its subsequent interpretations by the U.N. Committee Against
Torture makes clear that harmful conduct is intended for a proscribed purpose
associated with torture. Put another way, a state actor who whips a subject
until he confesses to a crime cannot evade criminal prosecution of torture by
simply shifting the narrative of his intent to intelligence collection as opposed
to physical harm.
While the language of intent is ambiguous in 18 U.S.C. § 2340, its
definition of mental torture is particularly narrow. It reduces mental torture
to four limited categories and contains an impact-duration requirement that
physical torture does not.315 It was purportedly tailored in this fashion to
shield U.S. law enforcement from accusations of torture and hedge against
due process concerns.316 While it is true that the Convention does not define
mental torture, or mental pain or suffering, in such detail, the U.S. definition
“of mental torture is so narrow that the lawyers had to add only the slightest
dash of interpretive exaggeration to reach their conclusions [that sleep
deprivation and other forms of psychological torture were in fact
permitted].”317 Luban and Shue argue that it is “materialist bias” that
physical torture is somehow more real than mental torture and a “forensic
fallacy” that due process requirements of specificity in criminal law are
incorrectly identified with defining characteristics of the crime.318 More
specifically, because 18 U.S.C. § 2340 does not provide a narrowly-tailored
definition for physical pain or suffering, it implies that psychological distress
is not as legitimate as physical pain or suffering.319 Further, concerns about
false accusations against law enforcement or the subjectivity of the term
“mental pain or suffering” do not explain why psychological torture is
reduced to four limited categories or a requirement of “prolonged”
duration.320 The language does not proscribe the full range of psychological
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Hathaway et al., supra note 41, at 796 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(A)–(D).
Hearing, supra note 45, at 12–13 (statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Mark Richard).
Luban & Shue, supra note 19, at 826.
Id. at 842, 853.
Id. at 849–50.
Id. at 852.
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torture; it simply makes it harder to prosecute. To use Luban and Shue’s
term, it is a “forensic fallacy” to use a desire for specificity to constrain the
definition of psychological torture.321
In U.S. criminal law, factfinders are frequently tasked with making
subjective determinations. Consider the U.S. federal stalking statute, which
requires the adjudicator to assess whether a defendant engaged in conduct
that “causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably expected to cause
substantial emotional distress” to another.322 The terms “reasonably
expected” and “substantial emotional distress” are arguably as subjective as
“mental pain or suffering.” Yet, just as the term “mental pain or suffering”
is an adequate term for the international community, the language is
sufficient for a factfinder to interpret and make a determination.
Applying the Convention’s definition of mental torture allows for the
broad range of psychological torture to be prosecuted and encourages an
internationally recognized understanding (and ban) of psychological torture.
If it is the United States’ intent to have an absolute prohibition on torture
(regardless of who commits it), using a broader definition of mental torture
and allowing for informed interpretation by the courts is a stronger means to
achieving those ends.
CONCLUSION
Mohammed Jawad was ultimately released from Guantanamo Bay
following a successful habeas corpus suit.323 The United States failed to
produce reliable evidence that Jawad had thrown the explosive device at the
American convoy in Afghanistan.324 Jawad’s confession in Afghanistan was
deemed to be coerced through torture and subsequent interviews in
Guantanamo were viewed as unreliable because they were tainted by his
treatment there.325 And while he was ultimately able to return to his family
321. Id. at 855. Indeed, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
shared concerns that deviations in domestic definitions of torture would risk creating “loopholes”
for committing torture. Accordingly, the Office recommended that the United States reconsider
“withdrawing its interpretative understandings and reservations,” and in particular, ensure that acts
of psychological torture are not qualified as “prolonged mental harm.” Concluding Observations,
supra note 62, at 3.
322. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
323. Bacha v. Obama, No. 05–2385, 2009 WL 2149949 (D.D.C., July 17, 2009); see also
Mohammed
Jawad
–
Habeas
Corpus,
ACLU
(Aug.
24,
2009),
https://www.aclu.org/cases/mohammed-jawad-habeas-corpus.
324. Mohammed Jawad – Habeas Corpus, supra note 323 (explaining that the judge found “no
credible evidence to continue holding” Jawad).
325. Bacha, 2009 WL 2149949; see also Mohammed Jawad – Habeas Corpus, supra note 323;
Court Found Inadequate Case Against ACLU Client Mohammed Jawad, ACLU (July 28, 2009),
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/gitmo-detainee-should-be-sent-home-after-torture-and-illegaldetention.
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in Afghanistan, the ramifications of losing the better part of a decade of his
life in detention and repeated torture started to show.326 Despite a military
panel of physicians repeatedly documenting that Jawad had “no psych
issues,” Jawad was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder in 2009 by
New York University psychologist Katherine Porterfield.327 In a 2016
interview with The New York Times, Jawad declined to discuss his mental
health, but instead remarked, “[t]hey tortured us in jails, gave us severe
physical and mental pain,” adding, “‘[o]f course we have’ flashbacks, panic
attacks and nightmares.”328
Mohammed Jawad was tortured at Guantanamo Bay when U.S. officials
subjected him to sleep deprivation. And while some may dismiss enforced
sleep deprivation in its current form as abuse, “torture-lite,” or only as one
piece in a moving torture puzzle, sleep deprivation in its current permitted
form undoubtedly rises to the level of torture by the United States’ own
anemic definition. Moreover, the permissive nature of the Army Field
Manual 2-22.3, coupled with a watered-down domestic definition of torture,
fosters a culture that downplays the implications of torturing enemy
combatants. In fact, unverified reports suggest that the practice of sleep
deprivation and sleep interruption continue at Guantanamo Bay.329 But those
reports need not be proven true to encourage reform. History has
demonstrated that when legal safeguards against torture are feeble, threats to
national security will serve as the impetus to exploit them.330
In Alberto Gonzales’s January 25, 2002, Memorandum to President
George W. Bush, he made an effort to persuade the President that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.331 Anticipating
326. See Apuzzo et al., supra note 158; Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, Bacha,
2009 WL 2149949.
327. See Apuzzo et al., supra note 158.
328. Id.
329. See supra Section II.C.
330. More recently, former President Donald Trump advocated for enhanced interrogation
methodology. On January 26, 2017, during his first week in office, he appeared on “Hannity,” a
Fox News television program to discuss his policies on various topics including national security.
There, he advocated for a return to enhanced interrogation methodology, stating that waterboarding
was effective and “just short of torture.” Interview with Donald Trump, President, in Washington,
D.C. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/cable-exclusive-president-trump-sitsdown-with-sean-hannity-at-white-house. That same week, The Washington Post reported on and
made available a draft executive order, reportedly from the Trump Administration, that would
revoke Executive Order 13,491. No such executive order was enacted by President Trump during
his term in office and no reports indicated a return to employing CIA black sites or enhanced
interrogation techniques. See Greg Miller, White House Draft Order Calls for Review on Use of
CIA
‘Black
Site’
Prisons
Overseas,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-draft-order-calls-forreview-on-use-of-cia-black-sites-overseas/2017/01/25/e4318970-e310-11e6-a5475fb9411d332c_story.html.
331. Memo from Gonzales to Bush, supra note 65.
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pushback, the White House Counsel listed some supportive arguments and
potential counter-arguments to conclude that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees.332 The last counter-argument
Gonzales listed was that the decision that the Geneva Conventions did not
apply “could undermine U.S. military culture which emphasizes maintaining
the highest standards of conduct in combat.”333
Before President Bush made a decision regarding whether to apply the
Geneva Convention protections to detainees, then Secretary of State Colin
Powell sent a memorandum to the Counsel to the President and the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs.334 The Secretary of State saw
two options for President Bush, but both included “treat[ing] all detainees
consistent with the principles of the [Geneva Conventions].”335 He argued
that deciding that the Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict would
be incongruous with the United States’ historic policy and practice of
supporting the Geneva Conventions and endanger U.S. troops adding that
“[i]t has a high cost in terms of negative international reaction, with
immediate adverse consequences for our conduct of foreign policy.”336
In 2009, during a visit to the CIA, President Obama defended the release
of memoranda describing the end of enhanced interrogation:
[He] added that he ended the controversial interrogation techniques
mentioned in the memos because the United States “is stronger and
more secure” when it can deploy both power and the “power of our
values, including the rule of law.” “What makes the United States
special . . . is precisely the fact that we are willing to uphold our
values and our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy,
even when we are afraid and under threat, not just when it’s
expedient to do so . . . .”337
The prohibition of torture should be absolute in the United States of
America. American law in letter and practice demonstrates the very nature
of American values. And where a state uses torture or brute force in its
governance, it loses any moral standing before the international community
and weakens its legitimacy before its own citizenry.338 Furthermore, by

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Memo from Colin Powell, supra note 37; see also A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html?
(last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
335. Memo from Colin Powell, supra note 37, at 1.
336. Id. at 2.
337. In CIA Visit, Obama Defends Interrogation Memo Release, CNN (Apr. 20, 2009),
https://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/20/obama.cia/index.html.
338. Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From Universal
Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 91 (2001).
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setting the example that every player on the international stage can redefine
the word “torture,” the United States effectively renders all commitments to
proscribe torture meaningless, endangering its servicemembers and citizens
abroad. In all likelihood, threats to national security will continue. A more
robust definition of torture matching the spirit and letter of the Convention
Against Torture and an explicit prohibition against the use of sleep
deprivation as an interrogative or punitive tool will better protect the United
States from compromising its values when facing future threats.

